
COMPANY "A," 



CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U. S. A., 



1846-'48, 



MEXICAN ¥AK. 



i GUSTAVUS W. SMITH. 

KOHMEK1.Y LIEUTENANT OF ENGINEERS, AND BYT. CAPTAIN, 

U. S. ARMY. 





THE BATTALION PRESS, 



I s 9 6 



_~J1 



COMPANY "A," 



CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U. S. A.. 



1846-'48, 



MEXICAN WAR. 



GUSTAVUS W. SMITH. 



FORMERLY LIEUTENANT <»K ENGINEERS, \M) BVT. CAPTAIN, 



r. s. ARMY. 



Til E BATT AL ION IMi ESS, 
I 8 9 6 . 






DEC 28 1903 
D.ofD, 



PREFACE. 



Executive Document, No 1, United States Senate, December 
7, 1847. contains a Communication from the Secretary of War. 
transmitting to Congress the official reports of commanding gen- 
erals and their subordinates in the Mexican War. 

The Secretary says: ""The company of engineer soldiers, 
authorized by the act of May 15, 1846, 1ms been more than a year 
on active duty in Mexico, and has rendered efficient service. I 
again submit, with approval, the proposition of the Chief Engineer 
for an increase of this description of force." ( Senate-Ex. Due. 
No. 1. 1847, p. 67.) 



(3) 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

Page 

Preface. - - - - - - - 3 

Chap. I. — Enlistment — Instruction — -Detention on the Rio 
Grande — March to Victoria and Tampico — Land- 
ing at Vera Cruz — Death of Captain Swift. - 7 
' II. — Engaged in Operations against Vera Cruz. - 21 
III. — After tlic Surrender of Vera Cruz to the Occupa- 
tion of Puebla. - 28 
'■ IV. — From Puehla to Churubusco. - 34 
V. — Capture of the City of Mexico. - 48 
VI. — In the City of Mexico; Return to West Point. - ~>7 
Appendix A.— Brief Extracts, from Wilcox's History of the 

Mexican War. 1892. - - - -66 

B. — Promotions of Enlisted Men of the Company. 69 



(.-.. 



CHAPTER I. 



ENLISTMENT— INSTRUCTION— DETENTION ON THE RIO GRANDE— MARCH 

TO VICTORIA AND TAMPICO— LANDING AT VERA CRUZ— DEATH 

OF CAPTAIN SWIFT. 



Previous to the war with Mexico there existed among the 
people of the United States a strong prejudice against maintain- 
ing even a small regular army in time of peace. Active opposition 
to a permanent, regular military establishment extended to the 
West Point Academy, in which cadets were trained and qualified 
to become commissioned oilicers of the army. That Academy was 
then a component part of the Military Engineer Corps. For years 
the chief of the Corps had, in vain, urged upon Congress, the neces- 
sity for having, at least one company of enlisted engineer soldiers 
as a part of the regular army. 

In the meantime lie had, however, succeeded in persuading the 
Government at Washington to send — by permission of the Govern- 
ment of France— a selected Captain of the U. S. Engineer Corps 
to the French School of engineer officers at Met/.; for the purpose 
of having in the U. S. Army, an officer qualified to instruct and 
command a company of engineer soldiers in case Congress could 
be induced to authorize the enlistment of such a company. 

Captain Alexander J. Swift was the officer selected to be sent to 
Mctz. On his return to the United States, he was assigned to tem- 
porary duty at West Point awaiting the long delayed passage of an 
act authorizing the enlistment of a company of U. S. Engineer 
soldiers. 

That act was passed soon after the commencement of hostilities 
with Mexico. It provided for the enlistment of an engineer 
company of 100 men. in the regular army. The company to be 
composed of 1<» sergeants, 10 corporals, 30 artificers, 39 second class 
privates, and 2 musicians; all with higher pay than that of enlisted 
men in the line of the army. 

Captain Swift was assigned to the command ; and, at his request, 
I was ordered to report to him as next officer in rank to himself. 
At my suggestion, Brevet Second Lieutenant George B. McClellan, 
who had just been graduated from the Military Academy, was 
issigiied as junior officer of the company. 

(T) 



At that time I had been an officer of engineers for four 3-cars ; 
my rank was that of second lieutenant. All the first lieutenants, 
and some of the second lieutenants, of that corps, were then in sole 
charge of the construction of separate fortifications, or were en- 
gaged in other important duties. Captain Swift was not disposed 
to apply for the assignment of any of those officers to be subalterns 
under him in a company of soldiers. 

I had taught McClellan during his last year in the Academy, 
and felt assured that lie would be in full harmony with me in the 
duties we would bo called npo:i to perform under Captain Swift. 
It is safe to say that no throe officers of a company of soldiers ever 
worked together with less friction. The understanding between them 
was complete. There were no jars — no doubts or cross purposes — 
and no conflict of opinion or of action. 

In the beginning I was charged with the instruction of the 
company as an infantry command, whilst the Captain took control 
of \]\e recruiting, the collection of engineer implements — including 
an India Rubber Ponton Bridge— and ho privately instructed 
McClellan and myself, at his own house, in the rudiments of 
practical military engineering which ho had acquired at Metz. In 
the meantime we taught him, at the same place, the manual of 
arms and Infantry tactics which had been introduced into the army 
after he was graduated at the Military Academy. In practical 
engineer drills the Captain was always in control. 

After the men were passably well drilled in the "Infantry School 
of the Company"; the time had come for him to take executive 
command on the infantry drill ground. lie did this on the first 
occasion, like a veteran Captain of Infantry until "a rest" was 
ordered. 

Whilst the men were "at rest", McClellan and myself quietly, 
but earnestly, congratulated him upon his successful debut as drill 
officer of an Infantry Company. lie kindly attributed to our in- 
struction in his house, whatever proficiency he had acquired in the 
now tactics which had then been recently introduced. 

But, after the company was again called to "Attention" and 
the drill was progressing, whilst marching with full company 
front across the plain, the men all well in line, to my surprise the 
Captain ordered " faster'', and added "the step is much too slow ". 
Of course we went " faster ". In a short time the Captain ordered 
"faster still, the step is very much too slow". This order was 
several times repeated, and before the drill ended we were virtually 
" at a run ". 

After the drill was over and the Company dismissed from the 



parade ground, I asked the Captain why he had not given the 
commands " quick time " and " double quick ", instead of saying 
" faster *' and "still faster". He said he did not intend the step 
should be " quick time" — much less "double quick". He only 
wanted the rate to be in "common time — 90 steps a minute"; 
and added: "you had not reached thai rate when the drill ended ''. 

I insisted that lie must be mistaken, and told him we were 
marching in "common time" or verv near it, when he first gave 
Hhc order, "faster". He persisted that he was right in regard 
to the rate of the stop— said " that he had carefully counted it, 
watch in hand"; and added: "You were, at the last, not making 
more than 85 steps to the minute". I was satisfied that he was 
mistaken; but he relied implicitly upon the correctness of his 
count and the accuracy of his watch. 

McClellan and 1 proceeded to the company quarters, of which I 
still had charge. On the way we referred to the matter of the 
step, and both of us were at a loss to account for the misapprc- 
, hension we were sure the Captain labored under in regard to it. 

I asked McClellan to take out his watch and count whilst I 
marched in ''common time". I made t'O steps per minute-- and 
repeated it more than once. It presently dawned upon us that our 
Captain, whilst consulting his watch, had counted only one foot ill 
getting at the number of steps: and that we were really making 
170 steps to the minute when he counted 85. The mystery was 
solved, the Captain had counted "the left foot" only. 

When we next went to his house for instruction in details of the 
school of the engineer soldier, I asked him how many steps we were 
making a minute when he first ordered "faster", lie said "about 
45". I replied: "That's it. We have found out what was the 
matter. You counted only the left foot. We were marching in 
'common time' when you ordered us to move ' faster '; and you 
pushed us to nearly twice' that rate ". 

"The cat was out of the bag." The Captain saw it at once and 
laughed heartily over the error he had fallen into in the latter part 
of his "first appearance" as captain, in drilling the company as 
infantry- He made no such mistake thereafter; and the men 
never knew of his "count", watch in hand. 

On the 26th of September, 1846, we sailed from New York, 71 
rank and file, for Brazos Santiago, under orders to report to General 
Taylor, commanding the U. S. army in Mexico. We landed at 
Brazos on the l-th of October, remained at that point for several 
days, proceeded thence to the mouth of the Uio Grande and 
arrived at Camargo on the 2nd of November. There the company 



10 

was delayed for several weeks because transportation for the en-! 
gineer train to the headquarters of the Army at Monterey, was not 
then available. 

The Company left Carmargo for Brazos, on the 29th of Novem- 
ber, under orders to proceed to Tampico by sea, but was ordered 
to return to Matamoros with a portion of its tools, and march, via 
Victoria, to Tampico — the bulk of its train to be transported to the 
latter place by water. 

Whilst detained at Camargo instruction in the school of the 
engineer soldier was kept up, and infantry drills were constantly 
practiced. During that time several thousand troops were in camp 
near Camargo, and the men of the engineer company learned that 
they were, by the line of the army, styled: "the pick and shovel 
brigade". Their officers advised them not to care for this epithet 
but, "take it easy, continue to endeavor to become model infantry, 
and engraft on that a fair knowledge of the duties of the engineer 
soldier'. They were assured that "for heavy work", details would 
have to be made from the line of the army; and these details 
would, for the time, constitute the real " pick and shovel brigade " 
under the control of engineer officers, assisted by trained engineer 
soldiers. When the time came for close lighting the engineer 
company would be at the front. 

The troops stationed on the Rio Grande during the fall of 1846, 
suffered greatly from Mexican diarrhoea, fevers and other diseases. 
Several men of the engineer company died, and Captain Swift 
and twenty of the men were left in hospital at Matamoros, when 
the company finally left the latter place. 

Before giving an account of our first march in the enemy's coun- 
try, it may be well to state here, that with two exceptions, the 
enlisted men of the engineer company were native born, and all 
but four of them were raw recruits. Each of these four had served, 
with credit, during one or more terms of enlistment in the regular 
army. Three of them were promptly made sergeants, and the 
fourth was a musician (bugler). 

All of the recruits but one, were very carefully selected material, 
out of which to form, as soon as practicable, skilled engineer soldiers. 
The one exception was a short, fat, dumpy, Long Island Dutch- 
man — a good cook, specially enlisted by Captain Swift to cook for 
the men. lie was given the pay and rank of artificer of engineers. 
The men looked upon him more as a servant of theirs than as a 
fellow soldier. lie was well satisfied with his position, prided 
himself on his special duties, rather looked down upon ''soldiers" 
— and was impudent by nature. 



11 

All went well enough with the "cook " until he was required t«» 
take his place in the ranks, at regular bi-montly "muster, and 
inspection " for pay. His performance on that occasion was so 
grotesquely awkward that I directed he should he put through the 
"squad-drill " by one of the sergeants, who was a thoroughly com- 
petent, hut rather severe, drill-master. 

The "cook' 5 felt that his rights were invaded, in requiring him 
to submit to be drilled. The sergeant made no progress in teach- 
ing him. After three days' trial, he reported to me that he was 
mortified, and ashamed, to have to admit he could do nothing 
with "that cook''; and he asked to be relieved from the duty of 
drilling him. In reply to my question : "Can't you make him 
obey you?'' He replied: "No — the only thing I can do is to kill 
him "; and added: "When that kind of tiling has to be done, in 
this company, my understanding is, the lieutenant in command 
is the only one who has the right to kill ". 

I relieved the sergeant, and told him I would take the "cook " 
in hand at the next drill. On the following day, I marched him 
offinto the dense chapparel,on the bottom lands near Matamoros. 
After following obscure paths, about three miles in their windings 
through the jungle, I halted him in a small open space a few 
hundred yards from the company camp. lie thought no doubt, 
we were live miles from camp — in a boundless wilderness — whilst, 
in fact, we were at no time five hundred yards away. 

I told him of the report that had been made to me of his dis- 
obedience, informed him that I had brought him into the chap- 
parel for the purpose of compelling him to obey me; called his 
attention to the fact that we were in the enemy's country in time 
of war; all of our lives were in peril, and that persistent dis- 
obedience on the part of any officer or soldier to the legal authority 
of those over him. was punishable with death ; that I did not 
propose to place him before a Court Martial ; but, would kill him, if 
he did not implicitly obey an order I proposed then and there to 
give him. 

I measured 15 paces in front of him and placed a small white 
chip on the ground, called him to " attention ", ordered him to 
place his eyes on that chip, and told him if he removed them from 
it before I gave the command "rest",] would run him through 
with my rapier. 

I then drilled him at the manual of arms for about 20 minutes. 
Large beads of perspiration rolled down his face — he began to totter 
on his feet — and I gave tin 1 command "rest ". He had not taken 
his eyes from the chip. 



12 

At the command "rest", he drew a long sigh of relief and uttered 
a subdued but prolonged " Oh ". I asked him if he now thought 
be could obey the sergeant, He replied: "Yes, I will obey 
anybody ". 

I told him I would temporarily withdraw what I had said about 
killing him, and would put him on his good behavior. I drilled 
him about two hours longer; and then took him, by a circuitous 
route, through the jungle, back to camp. lie was obedient enough 
thereafter. 

When the war had ended and I was relieved from duty with the 
company, one of the men told me that " the cook", on his return 
from the drill I had given him said : " The Lieutenant took me 
wav off, ever so far, in the chapparal, and told me he took me there 
to kill me if I didn't mind him. The little devil meant it, and 
would have done it too, if I had fooled with him like I had done 
with the sergeant,'' 

Except this case, of "the cook ", there had been no difficulty in 
bringing the men of the company to a high standard of drill and 
discipline as an infantry company, and a reasonable degree of pro- 
ficiency in the school of the engineer soldier. But, on their first 
march into the enemy's country, they were called upon to do an 
immense amount of hard work not specially refeirred to in their 
preliminary instruction. 

THE MARCH FROM MATAMOROS TO VICTORIA AND TAMPICO. 

By special orders from General Taylor, brought by Major George 
A. McCall to Captain Swift, the latter was charged with the duty 
of repairing the road from Matamoros to Victoria, and making it 
practicable for artillery and the baggage train; and to do this, if 
possible, so that the whole command might make its prescribed 
daily marches and arrive at Victoria on a named day. Captain 
Swift was authorized to call upon the commander of the forces, 
on this march, for such assistance as might be needed to perform 
the work; and was directed to do no more to the road than was 
barely sufficient to enable the trains to pass over it. It was not 
expected that we would ever have occasion to pass through that 
region again; and it was not proposed to make a permanent road 
for the benefit of Mexicans. 

Captain Swift being sick in hospital, the foregoing instructions 
were given to me, as Commander of the company, by Major McCall, 
who, in the capacity of Adjutant-General of the forces under 
General Patterson, accompanied him on this march. 



13 

Under orders from General Taylor, the company of engineers, 
reduced to two officers and forty-live enlisted men for service, 
marched from Matamoros on the 21st of December, 184G, with a 
column of volunteers under General Patterson, to join General 
Taylor's army at Victoria. We arrived at the latter place on the 
4th of January, 18-17. A great deal of work had been done by 
details of volunteers and the engineer company in making the 
road practicable for artillery and b igg ige wagon 5. Without dwell- 
ing upon daily operations, the folio wirg statement of the manner 
in which we made our way across a difficult stream may be of 
interest. 

About noon one day I was informed by Major McCall, who had 
ridden ahead of the working party, that there was an exceedingly 
difficult " river-crossing" about one mile in front, and that he feared 
we would be detained there for, perhaps, two days. I galloped 
forward to the [dace designated. It look?d ugly. The banks of 
the stream were something more than 100 feet high and quite steep. 
Guiding my horse down to the water's edge, I crossed the river 
which was from two to three feet deep, and about one hundred 
yards wide. The bottom was fair enough, until within a few yards 
of the opposite shore, where it was soft mud. (Jetting through this 
with some difficulty I rode to the top of the bank on the far side. 

To make an ordinary practicable road across that stream would 
require two or three day's work of several hundred men. It seemed 
a clear case for the free use of drag-ropes to let the wagons down 
into the stream on the near side, and haul them up the opposite 
bank. 

It was plain to me that with a working party of two hundred 
men — which was the greatest number we could supply with tools — 
a straight steep ramp could be cut on both banks in six or eight 
hours hard work. The greatest difficulty would be encountered in 
getting out of the stream on the far side. 

Returning quickly to where L ha 1 left Major McCall, I asked him 
to give me a working party of about 800 men, told him I would 
find use for that number and that in my opinion, with that force, 
the wagon train could be put acr >ss th i stream before dark. The 
commanding General thought my requisition for the working tie- 
tail was extravagent, as we scarcely had tools enough for a quarter 
of that number of men. But the detail was ordered, as called for, 
to report to me. In the meantime the engineer company an 1 its 
train was taken to the crossing, and the character of the work to be 
done there was explained to the men. 



14 

Leaving Lieutenant McClellan with a portion of the company to 
take charge of the near hank, directing him to halt there ahout 300 
of the working party and send ahout 500 to me on the opposite 
hank, I crossed the stream with the rest of the company and ex- 
plained to them the work to he done on that side, particularly the 
means to he used in getting out of the river. On each side of the 
stream the working party was divided into three "reliefs'', or 
relays — with one hundred men or more held in reserve, to meet 
contingencies. 

The working party arrived in good season, tools were promptly 
distributed to the first "relief" on each side of the river, and the 
men were told that, if they would work as at a " corn-shucking- 
match ", or as if the " house was on fire", they would he let off in 
an hour, or less, depending- on the rapidity and effectiveness of 
their work. It was to be a race against time. I wanted all the 
work there was in them, and wanted it inside of an hour. 

Before the hour was up the '"first relief" on each side of the 
river, was ordered to stop work, drop their tools, get out of the road 
and take to the hushes. The "second relief" was immediately 
inarched into the vacated places, seized the tools, and worked like 
the first— and on the same conditions. So with the "third relief"; 
and, inside of three hours frcm the time the work began, the 
engineer wagons were crossing the river. They soon moved on, 
leaving the rest of the forces to follow at their leisure. 

The volunteer officers afterwards complained to me that the 
"wild work " on the hanks of that river, had "scattered "their men 
so badly, it was several days before they could he again got into 
their proper places. 

This case was an exception — a frolic. The usual daily work on 
the road was more regular and continuous, without disorder. 

It may perhaps not he out of place here to mention, that ahout 
the time I sent the "first relief" into the hushes, and set the 
"second relief" to work under the directions of men of the 
engineer company, the commander of the forces, with his staff, 
arrived on the bank where McClellan was in charge, and asked for 
me. He was told that I was on the opposite hank. Just at that 
time the confusion and wild yells of the "first relief" and the 
loud cheers of the "second relief" when told that they, too, would 
he let off inside of an hour, provided they would work as if engaged 
in a " corn -shucking- match ", astounded the general, and had to 
him the appearance of disorder, perhaps mutiny. 

On asking Lieutenant McClellan what it meant, the latter re- 
plied : "It is all right; Lieutenant Smith has the larger portion of 



15 

the engineer company with him on that bank; and I can see him, 
and men of the company near him in the road, all of whom seem 
to be quietly giving instructions to the new working party"'. 

After starting the ''second relic!" to digging in the road, I had 
gone to the brow of the bank overlooking the work which was 
being done, mostly by my own men in the river, where the road 
was :<» leave it. The engineer sergeant, in charge of that work in- 
formed me that he was then in immediate need of about twenty 
additional men. The reserve working force was not far from me. 
I called out for a sergeant and twenty men, without arms or ac- 
coutrements, to come to me. Pointing to the river, just under the 
placj ai which I was standing, I directed the sergeant of this 
reserve party to take his men down at once and report to the en- 
gineer sergeant in charge there. The bank was precipitous. The 
sergeant of the reserve working party said that he would take his 
men back about one hundred yards, and go down by the road on 
which the "second relief'' was working. I demurred, and told 
him again, to take his men straight to where they were needed, 
lie still hesitated. I pushed him over the brow of the bank, and 
he went headlong into the river. I then ordered his men to follow 
him. They did it with a cheer and regular " Comanche-whoop" — 
sliding down the slope, which was too steep to stand on. 

This scene, too, was witnessed from across the river by the Gen- 
eral of the forces and his staff. I did not know they were there; 
but if I had. it would have made no difference; 1 was in charge 
of the working party, and in haste to finish that special job. 

On our arrival at Victoria, the company was relieved from duty 
under General Patterson, and I was directed to report to the head- 
quarters of General Taylor. On the 12th of January the company 
was ordered to report to General Twiggs. With two companies of 
the line to furnish additional details for labor when required I was 
charged with the duty of making the road between Victoria and 
Tampico practicable for wagons. These three companies left Vic- 
toria on the 13th. 

The following extracts from ray official report of the operations 
of the Engineer Company for the month vi' January, 1847, illus- 
trate, in part, the difficulties met with. 

''The first day, (out from Victoria, ) we had three bad boggy 
brooks to cross; besides a great deal of cutting to do with axes in 
order to open t!:.' road; and many bad ravines and gullies to 
render passable. To make a bridge, across a boggy stream, with 
no other material than the short, knotty, hard and crooked ciiap- 
paral bush, was no easy matter. The first day's march was about 



► 



16 

ten miles — we encamped about sunset after a very hard day's 
work." 

In order to shorten the route and save the forces one day's 
march, we were, for several days, working on a mule path "cut-off" 
from the main road. 

"January 14th. The mule path was infamous. No wagon had 
ever traveled that road — the rancheros have a tradition of a bull 
cart that, it is said, once passed that way. I believe, however, that 
the story is not credited. We worked from dawn of day until dark 
and encamped about six miles from where we started in the 
morning and about the same distance from the camp we wished 
to reach that day." 

" January 15th. Another day's tremendous hard work." 

" January 16th. We had again a very severe day's work." 

"January 17th. Road improved very decidedly, but still a 
good deal to do. We managed, by getting a little ahead with our 
repairs after the army encamped for the night, to get along without 
seriously delaying the column." 

We arrived at Tampico on the 23rd. The distance from Victoria 
to Tampico is 120 miles; whole distance from Matamoros to Tam- 
pico, by way of Victoria, is 354 miles. 

Although the service was arduous, the men came through it in 
good health, and were all the better sold iers for the practical schooling 
acquired in that 350 miles of road making. After this experience, 
ordinary marches and drills were to them, very light matters. 

TAMPICO TO VERA CRUZ. 

From Tampico we sailed for Lobos Island and Vera Cruz, on a 
small schooner, the Captain of which was a brave little Frenchman, 
who was not acquainted with the Mexican Gulf coast, and was not 
provided with accurate instruments for taking observations. Late 
one afternoon the clouds rolled away, and we distinctly saw the 
snow-clad peak of Orizaba. Tins was the first intimation to us 
that we were " somewhere" , near Vera Cruz. In a very short time 
we saw opposite to us a large fleet of vessels at anchor. 

We were south of Vera Cruz and were passing Anton Lizardo, 
the place to which we were bound. But a reef was between us and 
the anchorage where the fleet was quietly lying. The Captain of 
the schooner said he could cross the reef. Taking his place in the 
rigging from where he could better observe the breakers and the 
currents, the schooner tacked here and there, rapidly and repeat- 
edly, under the orders of the little Frenchman ; and we were soon 



17 

clear of the reef and breakers. It was now nearly dark. In a few 
moments after reaching the anchorage ground, we glided up a 
gentle slope, without perceptible shock ; and the how of the vessel 
was almost entirely out of water. 

In less than twenty minutes thereafter a boat from one of our 
men-of-war pulled alongside; and when the officer in charge learn- 
ed who we were, he said he would report at once to the naval 
commander; and had no doubt that the company with its effects 
would have to be landed on an adjacent island, while the schooner 
was being lightened and hauled off into deep water. 

He said the movements of the little schooner, through the heavy 
surf, across the dangerous reef, had been watched from the naval 
vessels with intense anxiety, and expectation that we would be 
wrecked and all hands lost. This feeling was changed to admir- 
ation when it was seen that the schooner was being very skillfully 
handled in the difficult channel; and all rejoiced when they saw 
the unknown little craft safely in smooth water; but were surprised, 
immediately after, to see her put on a course that would inevitably 
run her aground. 

We found that Captain Swift with the convalescents from Mata- 
moros on another vessel, had arrived before us. In the meantime 
Lieutenant J. G. Foster, of the Engineer Corps, had been assigned 
to duty with the Company. He was with Captain Swift. I at 
once reported to the latter, and he resumed command of the Com- 
pany; but the men remained on separate vessels. 

Captain Swift was still very sick ; to all appearance more feeble 
than when we left him at Matamoros. All the rfien he brought 
with him were convalescent. In a few days after our arrival at 
Anton Lizardo, an order was issued by General Scott for the trans- 
ports to move up next morning, towards Vera Cruz, with a view 
to landing the army on the main shore, opposite the Island of 
Sacrificios, two or three miles south of the city. On the morning 
of the day we were to make the landing the whole company was 
transferred to another vessel ; and all were again together. 

Early in the previous night, McClellan, who had just been 
aboard the vessel on which Captain Swift arrived, informed me that 
the latter proposed to lead the company ashore. Worth's division 
was to land first, and the engineer company was temporarily as- 
signed to that division. McClellan added: " The Captain is now 
too feeble to walk across the cabin of his vessel without assistance 
— the effort to lead the company in this landing will be fatal to 
him, and I told him I thought he ought not to attempt it. But, 



18 

he looks upon me as a boy,* and I have no influence with him in 
this matter. You ought to advise him against this thing. If he 
attempts it, it will cerbainly kill him." 

I fully agreed with McClellan in reference to the physical con- 
dition of the Captain; and the probable, if not certain, result of an 
attempt on his part to lead the company in the landing. But for 
me to advise him not to go ashore with us, was to request him to 
give me the command of his company in this important enter- 
] rise. I told McClellan that I felt a delicacy about tiie matter 
which made .me hesitate to advise the Captain to give me the com- 
mand of the company. lie replied: " Yes, but this case is beyond 
mere delicacy. The act of leading the company ashore will kill 
him ; and I think you can persuade him not to undertake it. You 
ought to try. I am sure he will not misconstrue your motive.'"' 

Urged thus, I pulled over to the Captain's vessel, after dark 
found him alone in the cabin, and quickly told him why I came. 
He listened patiently to all I had to say; thanked me cordially 
for the interest I took in his physical welfare; said ho fully appre- 
ciated the kindness shown; understood the motive which actuated 
the advice given; and added: "My mind is made up; I will lead 
the company in this landing; and would do so even if I knew 
that the bare attempt would certainly cost me my life." 

The next afternoon, the Captain, standing by the gangway, di- 
rected the embarkation of about 20 men in the smaller of the two 
surf boats in which the company was to land. Just as that boat 
was ready to pull away to make room for the larger boat, I said to 
him: " I suppose I am to go with this detachment of the Company; 
and if so I must get aboard now", lie replied "No. I wish you 
to go in the larger boat with me". To which I said: "All right", 
and added: "McClellan goes with the detachment?" The Captain 
said, "Yes." 

When the larger boat for the rest of the Company, came alono- 
side I relieved the Captain at the gangway and superintended the 
embarkation of the men in that boat. Tho Captain was lowered 
over the side of the vessel in a chair; and I, when all else was 
ready to pull oft', scrambled down into the clossly packed boat, and 
took my place in the bow. 

Each boat was rowed by sailers from the fleet under the direction 
of a naval officer. 

We had reason for anxiety in regard to the resistance we might 
meet with from Mexican batteries that could easily have been 
sheltered behind the sand hills immediately overlooking the open 

* At that time, McClollan was about 20 years of age. 



19 

beach on which the landing was to be made. A single cannon-shot 

striking one of the closely packed surf-boats would probably have 
sent it, and all on board, to the bottom. The anxiety of the soldiers 
was to get ashore before such a fate should befall them. They cared 
very little lor anything that might happen after they were on laud; 
but wished to escape the danger of having the boats sunk under 
them by Mexican batteries. 

When we were within five or six hundred yards of the beach all 
were startled by the whistling of shells and cannon balls close about 
our heads. This fire was soon understood to come from our Naval 
gunboats, and aimed at small parties of Mexican lookouts on shore. 
No resistance was made to the landing of Worth's division. 

When we were within two or three hundred yards of the beach, 
I made my way, over the heads of the men to the stern of the boat 
where the Captain was seated; and said to him I thought the time 
had come for him to get to the bow, if he still intended to lead the 
company in going ashore. 

For a moment the most painful expression I ever saw depicted 
on a human countenance marked his face. He rallied, however, 
almost immediately, and said: " I must, at the last moment, relin- 
quish my command "; and added " I turn the command over to you 
until the company is formed in line on the beach ". 

1 made my way quickly back to the bow ; ordered the right file 
of the company, two stalwart corporals — thorough soldiers, to go 
to the stern of the boat, take their places near the Captain, keep 
their eyes on me after they reached him, spring into the water 
when they saw me jump from the bow, seize the Captain, place 
him on their shoulders or heads, and bring him to me in the line 
on shore, without a wet thread on him. 

1 informed the corporals that I had been placed in full command 
by Captain Swift; warned them he would probably resist their 
bringing him ashore; but no matter what he said or did, they 
must obey my orders. They did it. The corporals were athletes 
— over six feet in height, young ami active. In the Captain's 
then physical condition he was as helpless as an infant in their 
hands. 

The water where they went overboard was nearly up to their 
necks; but when they brought the Captain to me he was as dry 
as whilst sitting in the boat. He had resisted them more violently 
than I anticipated. In vain they explained to him that they were 
instructed by me to take him ashore without his touching the 
water. He ordered them to put him down, used all his force 
to compel them to do so, repeated his orders in no measured terms, 



20 

and continued to denounce the corporals after they had placed him 
on his feet by my side. 

He was wild with rage. I at once relinguished to him the com- 
mand of the company, and said: " Captain, the corporals are not 
in fault. They simply obeyed my order whilst I was, by your 
authority, in command of the company. Blame me, if you will, 
but exonerate them ". 

He apologised to the corporals for kicking, striking, and other- 
wise abusing them, and thanked them for the service they had 
rendered him. The termination of this incident made an indelible 
impression on the men in favor of their Captain. 

That night the company slept among the sand hills a few 
hundred yards from the shore, undisturbed, except by a flurry of 
firing which occurred about 10 P. M., between a Mexican detach- 
ment and the Light battalion of Worth's division. This firing 
continued for a few minutes, and then all was quiet for the rest of 
the night. 

About sunrise next morning, the company moved several hundred 
yards, into its position on the sand hills, on the right of Worth's 
division in the line of investment, facing Vera Cruz which was 
about two miles distant, 

The Captain showed wonderful increase of vitality after he 
reached the shore. He conducted the company to its assigned 
place in the line of investment without much apparent difficulty 
in walking through the sand. 

But three hours exposure to the hot sun was more than he could 
bear; his strength was gone. He lost consciousness and was, by 
my order, carried to the beach on an improvised litter. The ser- 
geant of the party was instructed to report to the naval officer in 
charge of the surf boats, and in my name, request that Captain 
Swift be taken as soon as practicable, to the steamer which was 
the headquarters of General Scott, That request was promptly 
complied with; but the Captain's vitality was exhausted. He 
was sent to the United States on the first steamer that left Vera 
Cruz after the landing was effected, and died in New Orleans 
within twenty-four hours after his arrival at that place. 

Thus, the army and the country lost the services of one of the 
best officers of the U. S. Corps of Military Engineers; and the 
engineer company lost their trained Captain. 



CHAPTER II. 

ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS AGAINST VERA CRUZ. 



Within a short time after Captain Swift was taken to the beach, 
I received an order, from General Worth, directing me to withdraw 
the engineer company from the line of investment and report to 
General Patterson. The latter instructed me to locate and open a 
road through the chapparal to the old Malibran ruins. This was 
accomplished by the middle of the afternoon. General Pillow who 
was to occupy a position beyond Malibran, requested me to take 
charge of a working party of his troops and, with the engineer 
company, locate and open a road along his line to the bare sand 
hills on his left. In this work we were somewhat disturbed by the 
fire of Mexican detachments. 

On the 11th, the work of locating and opening the road along 
the line of investment was continued, the working party being- 
still a good deal annoyed by both infantry and artillery fire. At 
1 P. M., I reported to General Patterson that the road was opened, 
through the chapparal, to the bare sand hills. He ordered me to 
report, with the engineer company, to General Worth; and the 
latter directed me to report to the General Headquarters. 

On the same day I was ordered by Colonel Totten, Chief Engineer, 
to find and cut off the underground-aqueduct which conveyed 
water into Vera Cruz. That business was effectually accomplished 
by the engineer company on the 13th.* 

From that time, until the commencement of work upon the 
batteries and trenches, the engineer company and its officers were 
engaged in reconnoitring the ground between the picket line of 
our army and the fortifications of the city. My reports were made 
each night to the Chief Engineer. The night of the 15th, he 

* In illustration of tin- character of the work done during the first two or three days after 
the landing, the following- quotations from General Scott's official report are not irrelevant. 
He says . 

"The environs of the city outside the tire of its guns, and those of the castle, ait- broken 
into innumerable hills of loose sand, from twenty to two hundred and fifty feet in height, 
witli almost impassable forests of chapparal between." " In extending the line of investment 
around the city the troops, for three days have performed the heaviest labors in getting over 
the hills and cutting through the intervening forests." (" Ex. Doc. No. 1 " p. ,'lti.i 

(•21) 



9.9 



pointed out to mo, on a map of the city and its fortifications, the 
general location in which it was desired to place the army gun 
battery, on the southern prolongation of the principal street of the 
city, and within about six hundred yards of its fortifications. He 
directed me, with the engineer company, to closely examine that 
ground. I was informed by him, at the same time, that Captain 
R. E. Lee, of the engineer corps, had discovered a favorable 
position for a battery, of six heavy naval guns, on the point of a 
commanding sand ridge, about nine hundred yards from the 
western front of the city ; but no final decision would be made in 
regard to the naval battery until the army battery could be defin- 
itely located. He said General Scott was getting impatient at the 
delay; and I was directed to find, as soon as possible, a position 
that would satisfy the conditions prescribed, by the Chief Engineer, 
for an army battery. 

I explained those conditions to McClellan and to Foster; and 
informed them that I would assign one-third of the company to 
each of them as an escort — take one-third myself — and we would 
all three start, at daylight next morning, in search of a location 
for the required battery. It was necessary that we should be 
extremely careful not to get to fighting each other in the dense 
chapparal. 

We found a location that complied with the conditions. In 
reporting this fact to the Chief Engineer, I added: "The com- 
munication with the battery will be very difficult — will require 
a great deal of work — and will be dangerous". He ordered me to 
take the engineer company to the selected ground, next morning, 
and lay out the battery; and said he would direct Lieutenant G. 
T. Beauregard, who had supervised the construction of the field 
fortifications at Tampico, to assist in the work. 

At 2 P. M. that day the battery and magazine had been traced 
out, all necessary profiles carefully adjusted; and, the whole com- 
pleted, ready to commence throwing up the works. We had not 
been discovered by the Mexicans — though we could plainly see 
their sentinels on the walls; and occasionally hear words of 
command. After allowing the company to rest for a couple of 
hours we started to return to camp. 

In going forward we had the Mexicans before us; and by ex- 
ercising great care, at certain places, could avoid being seen. 
When our backs were turned to Vera Cruz I felt confident that we 
would soon be discovered and fired upon. I had cautioned the 
men to be as careful as possible; but, in spite of their best efforts, we 
were seen, and a heavy fire of artillery was opened upon us. The 



•2:1 

order to move at double-quick was immediately given. The 
company was conducted about three hundred yards, to a cut in a 
low sand ridge, that had been formed by a road crossing that ridge. 
All got safely into the cut. The Mexican artillery lire aimed at us, 
was continued for about twenty minutes. We had then before us 
an open level plain for live hundred yards. Soon after the lire 
upon us had ceased, 1 ordered the men to scatter and run rapidly 
across the plain until they reached a designated place of shelter 
behind high sand hills. Beauregard and I brought up the rear in 
this movement. The Mexicans re-opened their guns upon us whilst 
we were crossing the plain and continued to fire for some time after 
we reached the shelter above referred to. 

When I reported the result of that day's work to the Chief En- 
gineer, I urged him to permit a further examination to be made, 
for a location of the army gun battery, before attempting to con- 
struct the one we had just laid out. 

He consented, and we made further reconnaissance the next day. 
In the meantime the pickets of Worth's division had been con- 
siderably advanced. On returning from an examination at the 
extreme front that day I came across a detachment of the Fifth In- 
fantry not far from the Cemetery. Whilst explaining the object 
of my search to a group of four or five young officers, a person whom 
I took to be a veteran sergeant, said to me that he knew a good 
position for a battery, only a few hundred yards from where we 
then were. I asked him to describe it to me. 

From the description he gave I thought the ground referred to 
would be a favourable site; and asked him to tell me definitely 
how to reach it. He offered to guide me to the place. On getting 
to the position I found that the conformation of the ground consti- 
tuted almost a natural parapet for a six gun battery — requiring 
but little work to complete it for use. It afforded immediate shelter 
for men and guns. 

it was not on the prolongation of the main street of the city, and 
it was farther from the enemy's works than the site where a battery 
had already been laid out. But the communications with the pro- 
posed new location were shorter, and could easily be math' much 
safer — in every way better than was possible in the former case I 
thanked my guide for pointing out the position ; and told him I 
thought it would be adopted by the Chief Engineer. 

After our return to the group of young officers, my "guide'' was 
soon called away ; and, I then asked one of them the name of that 
" fine old Sergeant " who had pointed out such a good location for 



24 

the batter}' To my amazement lie replied ; "That was Major Seott, 
the commander of our regiment". 

The Major was enveloped in an ordinary soldier's overcoat and 
wore an old, common slouched hat. I had mistaken the "famous 
Martin Scott" for a "fine old Sergeant " of the line. 

On my return to camp I reported all the facts to the Chief En- 
gineer. The position first selected and laid out, for the army gun 
battery, was abandoned; and the location pointed out by Major 
Martin Scott was adopted. 

The work of throwing up batteries, digging trenches, and making 
covered communications with them, was commenced on the night 
of the 18th by large working parties detailed from the line. After 
that time, the officers of the engineer company, including myself, 
were placed on general engineer service — supervising the con- 
struction of the siege works. All the engineer officers then with 
the army, except the Chief, were in regular turn detailed for that 
duty; each having some of the men of the engineer company to 
assist him. 

After the work upon the army gun battery, the mortar batteries 
and the trenches had been fairly commenced, I was transferred to 
the naval battery and took my regular turn, with Captain R. E. 
Lee, and Lieutenant Z. B. Tower, in superintending its construct- 
ion. I was in charge of that work the day it opened its guns upon 
the fortifications of the city, having relieved Captain Lee that 
morning. Seeing him still in the battery, about the time the firing 
commenced, I asked him if he intended to continue in control; 
adding, " If so, I report to you for instructions and orders". He 
replied: " No. I am not in charge. I have remained only to see 
my brother, Lieutenant Sydney Smith Lee of the Navy, who is 
with one of the heavy guns. My tour of service is over. You are 
in control; and, if I can be of any service to you whilst I remain 
here, please let me know ". 

There had previously been a difference of opinion between Captain 
Lee and myself in regard to the dimensions that should be given 
to the embrasures. The Chief Engineer decided in favor of 
Captain Lee, and the embrasures were changed and made to con- 
form to his views. In a very short time after the tiring began one 
of the embrasures became so badly choked that it could not be 
used until the debris could be removed. Hastily renewing the 
blindage of brush-wood that had been used to conceal the work 
from view of the enemy during the construction, the detail of en- 
gineer soldiers then on duty, in the battery, cleared the embrasure 
of the obstructions, removed the blindage, and the gun resumed its 



25 

fire. .Just after that incident, 1 asked Captain Lee what he now 
thought in regard to the proper dimensions for the embrasures. 
lie replied: "They must be made greater when the battery is re- 
paired to-night." 

The*naval detachment had only forty rounds of ammunition; 
which was expended in about three hours, and the firing had to 
cease until the arrival of the next naval detachment. The latter 
when it came into the battery, had only forty rounds of ammunition 
and was to serve until relieved, the next afternoon by a third naval 
detachment. 

Before the ammunition of the first detachment was expended 
the embrasures were all in a very had condition — the battery was 
almost entirely unserviceable; and before the second detachment 
arrived I caused the embrasures to be filled up, until the battery 
could be repaired that night and put in good condition for re- 
opening the next day. 

The second naval detachment came into the battery about the 
middle of the afternoon. The naval captain in command, with- 
out consulting me, ordered the embrasures to be cleared at once, 
with the intention of immediately opening fire. Perceiving what 
was being done by the sailors in re-opening the embrasures, I 
ordered them to stop; and asked by whose authority they were 
acting. On being informed that their orders came from the com- 
mander of the detachment, I asked them to point him out to me. 
I immediately introduced myself to him, as the engineer officer 
in full charge of the construction of the battery, and told him if 
the embrasures were cleared the battery would still be unfit for 
service — that it could not be repaired until that night, and would 
then be put in better condition than it was when it first opened. 
The army gun battery would be ready next morning; and its fire, 
combined with that of the naval battery, after the latter was put 
in good condition, would be very effective. But, if the naval de- 
tachment opened tire that afternoon, the battery being unfit for 
service, its ammunition would be exhausted before night without 
hurting the enemy; and the battery would necessarily be silent 
the next day, when the army battery would open its tire. 

The naval captain insisted that the embrasures should be cleared 
at once, and the tiring resumed. 

I protested against his clearing the embrasures and told him that, 
but for the appearance of the thing, I would leave the battery and 
take my men with me if he persisted in carrying out his intentions. 
1 added: "I will remain here until regularly relieved, but will 
continue to protest against the course you propose to pursue". 



26 

He then told mo that it was " the General's " order that he should 
open fire that afternoon as promptly as possible. 

I asked him why he had not told me of that order in the first 
place ; and added: " It is not customary for (General Scott to give 
orders to engineer officers through officers of the navy. But, if 
you had told me in the beginning that he had ordered the battery 
to commence firing as soon as possible after you reached it, I would 
have accepted his order — coming to me through } r ou." 

To this he replied; "I did not say the order came from General 
Scott." I asked : "Whom did you mean when you said 'the General.' " 
He told me that he meant 'General Patterson." To which I re- 
plied : "I receive no orders in reference to this battery except from 
General Scott or the Chief Engineer of the Army." 

The naval captain finally said he would not open fire until next 
morning; provided I would report the circumstances to General 
Scott. I told him it was not usual for me to report my action di- 
rect to the General-in-Chief; but, I would report all the facts to the 
Chief Engineer as soon as I was relieved and had returned to camp , 
and he would report them to General Scott. 

When I commenced to make my report to the Chief Engineer he 
stopped me; and said he was instructed to order me to report in 
person, to ( ieneral Scott as soon as 1 reached camp. 

I obeyed the order; and was very coldly and formally told by 
" The General" : He had been informed it was my fault that the 
naval battery had not opened lire against Vera Cruz that afternoon. 
I answered : " I did prevent the fire being opened; but, that act was 
not a fault on my part ; and I can convince you of the latter fact 
if you will give me a hearing". 

He replied — still very coldly — " 1 hope you can do so". I then 
t related to him, in full, all that had occurred — as briefly stated 
above — between the commander of the naval detachment and 
myself. 

My reasons for opposing the opening of the fire of the battery 
seemed to produce little or no favorable impression on General 
Scott until I reached that part of the narrative in which I replied 
to the naval captain's statement that he meant General Patterson 
when he said "the General". I gave General Scott the exact words 
I had used in replying to the naval commander. At this lie rose 
from his seat — came to where 1 was standing, and clasping one of 
my hands in both of his; said: "Thank God I have young officers 
with heads on their shoulders and who know how to use them". 
He added : "your opinion, and your action, in this matter, would 
do credit to a Field Marshal of France"! 



27 

To which I made no reply, but thought to myself: " If there was 
a sergeant in the engineer company who, in view of the plain facts 
of this case, would, not have known that the naval battery ought 
not to open fire that afternoon, I would reduce him to the ranks 
before night." 

The following extracts from my official report of these operations 
may not be amiss in this connection : 

" Whenever we have acted as a company T have been most ably 
and efficiently supported by Lieutenants McClellan and. Foster ; 
and I am proud to say that the non-commissioned officers and men 
of the company have shown great willingness and skill in the dis- 
charge of the important duties assigned them. Great part of our 
labors have been performed under fire. On such occasions I have 
had every reason to be satisfied with the cool deportment and con- 
duct of the company. 

"In conclusion I regret that I have to state, a serious blow was 
inflicted on the military pride of the engineer company in not allow- 
ing them to participate in the ceremonies of the surrender, when 
it was well understood that the troops having had most to do in the 
attack were selected to take a prominent part in the proceedings." 

Wo all felt that, if our distinguished Captain had been with us, 
we would have been called on to take part in those ceremonies. 

The Chief Engineer, Col6nel Joseph G. Totten, in his report of 
operations against Vera Cruz, says: "The obligation lies upon me 
also to speak of the highly meritorious deportment and valuable 
services of the Sappers and Miners, [engineer company] attached 
to the expedition. Strenuous as were their exertions, their number 
proved to be too few, in comparison with our need of such aid. 
Had their number been four-fold greater, there is no doubt the 
labors of the army would have been materially lessened and the 
result expedited." (Ex. Doc. Xo. 1. p. 245). 



CHAPTER III. 

AFTER THE SURRENDER OF VERA CRUZ; TO THE 
OCCUPATION OF PUEBLA. 



From the capitulation of A T era Cruz, on the 29th of March, until 
we left that place on the 13th of April, the engineer company was 
principally engaged in assisting engineer officers in making sur- 
veys of the fortifications and surrounding ground, in dismantling 
our own batteries, magazines, &c; and aiding the Quartermaster's 
Department in landing and placing in depot the general engineer 
train of the army. 

In the meantime, on the 7th of April, I reported, through the 
senior engineer, to the Adjutant-General of the forces, that the en- 
gineer company would be ready to move with the advance division 
of the army on the 8th, if transportation for its train could be fur- 
nished. Transportation, together with orders to move with the 
advance division, were applied for. "The reply was that General 
Scott would, at the proper time, order such transportation for the 
engineer company as he deemed sufficient — and would, when it 
was his pleasure, order the company forward."* 

Twigg's division left on the 8th; Patterson's on the 9th ; on the 
11th Worth's division was ordered to move on the 13th; Quitman's 
brigade had been previously sent on an expedition to Alvarado; 
the garrison of Vera Cruz was designated. Tims, every soldier in 
the army, except the engineer company, had received instructions 
either to go forward or to remain. 

On the night of the 11th, in my evening report to the Adjutant 
of engineers, I asked the Senior Engineer f then serving with the 
army; when and where the engineer company was ordered; what 
I was ordered to do; and what transportation, if any, I was to have. 

On these subjects not one word had been stated, in either written 

* Taken from my official report for the month of April, 1847. G. W. S. 

+ Colonel Joseph G. Totten, Chief Engineer, had left Vera Cruz and returned to his duties 
in Washing-ton City. Major John L. Smith then became Senior Engineer with General Scott's 
forces. 

(28) 



29 

or printed orders, that had come to my knowledge. On the morn- 
ing of the 12th, General Scott consented that the engineer company 
should, if possible, move with the General Headquarters, which 
left at 4 p. m. that day. 

I then applied direct to the Chief Quartermaster for transport- 
ation. He told me that it was impossible to let me have any 
teams at that time — all the good teams had been taken by the 
army, General Worth w r as getting the last. 

A positive order from headquarters, was then procured by the 
Adjutant of engineers, requiring the Quartermaster's Department 
to furnish transportation for the engineer train, etc. The teams, 
such as they were, came into our camp about dark on the 12th. 
That night the wagons were loaded ; and we started half an hour 
before daylight on the 13th. 

The mules were wild, the teamsters could not speak English, 
some of them had never harnessed an animal; audit was soon 
apparent that the men of the company would have to put their 
muskets in the wagons and give their undivided attention to the 
mules. . At 2 p. m., after struggling through the deep sand, west 
of the city, we struck the firm beach, and could make better 
progress, for about three miles, to A T ergara, where the road leaves 
the coast, and again passes through deep sand. 

In the meantime one team had become broken down and 
useless before we got beyond the city. In order to procure another 
I had to take some of my owir men into the mule pen. Three 
Mexicans were given me to lasso the mules, and five men were re- 
quired to put them in harness — seasick, wild, little animals. One 
teamster deserted; one had his hand, and another had his leg 
broken ; and a number of mules in different teams, were crippled. 

At Vergara, half the load of each wagon was thrown out, before 
we entered upon steep ridges and deep sand immediately after 
leaving the beach. All the men were engaged in helping along 
the half loaded wagons. That night we slept in the sand ridges. 

On the 14th, we reached Santa Fe, eight miles from \ T era Cruz, 
threw out the half loads, and returned to Vergara. Before we 
again reached the beach, the men had actually to roll the empty 
wagons up every hill, the mules not being able to drag them. By 
10 p. m., we were again at Santa Fe, having killed three mules, 
and the men being worked nearly to death. Fortunately for us, 
several good mules that had escaped from preceding army trains, 
came out of the chapparal to our feed troughs, were caught, and 
"pressed " into engineer service. 

From Santa Fe the road was much better, but at every hill the 



30 

men had to take to the wheels and help the mules — this too, after 
throwing out half the load at the foot of some of the steeper hills. 
In this way, we reached the National Bridge, at 3 p. m. on the 16th. 

General Worth's division was about starting from that place to 
make a night march to Plan Del Rio. He informed me that our 
army would attack the enemy, at the Cerro Gordo Pass, on the 
afternoon of the 17th ; and said he desired that the engineer company 
should accompany his division. I informed him that my men and 
animals were utterly exhausted and could not go any further with- 
out several hours rest, But I assured him that we w T ould be in 
Plan Del Rio by noon of the next day. AVe rested at the National 
Bridge until 11. 30 p. m., on the Kith, and reached Plan Del Rio, 
about 11 a. m., on the 17th. 

At Cerro Gordo. Soon after our arrival at Plan Del Rio, I 
was ordered to detail an officer and ten men of the engineer com- 
pany to report to General Pillow for temporary service with his 
division. Lieutenant McClellan was placed in charge of that 
detail. 

With the remainder of the company, I was directed to report to 
Captain R. E. Lee, then acting as Chief Engineer of Twigg's 
division; who instructed me to allow the men to rest, whilst I 
accompanied him to the front, where Twigg's division was about 
going into action. Captain Lee informed General Twiggs that the 
engineer company was at Plan Del Rio, and had been ordered to 
serve with his division. I was directed by General Twiggs to return 
at once, and bring the company to the front as soon as possible. 

The action of the 17th was over before the engineer company 
arrived. Captain Lee directed me, with a portion of my men and 
a large detailed working party, to construct a battery that night, 
in a position lie had selected on the heights we had gained that 
afternoon. This was a work of some difficulty, owing to the rocky 
nature of the ground and the small depth of earth — in some places 
none, and nowhere more than a few inches. 

About 3 A. M. on the 18th I sent one of my men to the foot of 
the hill to awaken Lieutenant Foster, who was sleeping there with 
the company, and tell him lie must relieve me for the rest of the 
night. 

After putting Foster in charge I started to join the company — and 
became sound asleep whilst walking down the hill. Stumbling into 
a quarry hole, I found myself sprawling on a dead Mexican soldier 
— his glazed eyes wide open, within a few inches of mine. For a 
moment 1 felt that horror of a corpse which many persons have, at 
times, experienced. The probability that, in a short time after 



31 

daylight — in storming the strong position of the enemy — I might 
be as dead as the man upon whom I was lying, forced itself upon 
me. 

Before I could regain my feet streams of men were rushing past 
me in the darkness; and I heard and recognised, the voice of Lieu- 
tenant Peter V. Hagner, of the Ordnance, calling in no measured 
tone or language, upon these stampeded men to stop. Whilst 
promptly aiding Hagner to bring the fugitives to a halt, I forgot 
the dead Mexican, and the whole train of thought connected with 
the corpse. 

When something like order was restored on the hillside I learned 
from Lieutenant Hagner that he had been detailed to take one of 
our heavy guns up the hill to the battery. A regiment of 
Volunteers had been placed at his disposal to man the drag-ropes. 
Their arms had been left at the foot of the hill. On finding his 
way blocked by trees, Hagner had sent to procure axes from the 
engineer train ; and in the meantime the regiment at the drag- 
ropes had been permitted to lie down. Of course they went to sleep. 
Suddenly awakened by a false alarm that the Mexicans were upon 
them, they rushed down the hill to get their arms. Hagner soon 
procured the required axes and the gun was delivered at the 
battery in good time. 

At daylight I was again at the battery. A slight epaulment had 
been finished for three pieces of artillery, the platforms were laid, 
and the guns in position. I was then instructed by Captain Lee, 
to send ten men to report to him for special service; to order 
Lieutenant Foster with eight additional men, to report to him 
(Lee) for the purpose of opening a road for the light artillery 
around the foot of the hights; and I was ordered, with the rest of 
the company, to report to Colonel Harney, who was then in com- 
mand of IVrsifor Smith's brigade, of Twiggs' division. 

I was instructed to accompany that brigade when it moved 
forward to attack the enemy in position on a hill immediately in 
front of, and higher than that on which our battery had been con- 
structed. The Mexicans were in strong force on the higher hill. 

From our lower position we could not clearly see their lines nor 
determine how they were fortified. The hill they occupied was flat 
on top and their lines were set back from the crest of the pre- 
cipitous slope which faced us. The storming brigade was ordered to 
halt and reform just before reaching the top of the higher hill. 
At this point they were below the plane of the enemy's fire, and 
were when lying down, perfectly protected. In this position 
they were ordered to rest, until the order should be given to 



32 

rise, charge and carry the enemy's works by open assault. 

When the line was thus formed, I requested Colonel Harney not 
to give the order to charge until I could go on the plateau, get a 
clear view of the enemy's works, and report their character. I soon 
informed him that their main line was not more than forty or fifty 
vards from where our men were then lying, that the fortifications 
were very incomplete, offered no effective obstacle, and we could 
dash over the works without a halt. I then ordered my men to 
drop their tools and use their muskets. 

Whilst I was making this report to Colonel Harney, our attention 
was drawn to quite a sharp fire that the Mexicans had suddenly 
opened from a point close to the left flank and in the prolongation of 
our line. I told him I was certain there were no fortifications in 
that position ; and I had seen no troops there. The fire increased 
from that direction, and Colonel Harney ordered me to proceed 
rapidly with my men to the left of our line, direct two companies 
on that flank to wheel at once, to the left; and when he gave the 
order to charge, these two companies and the engineers would move 
to the left against the force that was firing upon us from that side. 

These dispositions on our left were made in a very few moments, 
and the order to charge was given immediately thereafter. The 
brigade sprang up, dashed over the short intervening space, and 
were almost instantly inside of the Mexican incomplete works. 

After a short, but bloody, hand to hand struggle, in which 
bayonets, swords, pistols, and butts of muskets were freely used, the 
Mexicans retreated in great disorder. The troops that had been 
faced to the left just before the order to charge was given, immecli- 
iately found themselves in the midst of a detachment of Mexicans, 
in a nest of surface quarry holes which gave them protection from 
distant fire and effectually concealed them from view until we were 
among them. The struggle here was hand to hand, and sharp for 
a short time. But they were driven from their quarry holes, back 
on their main line which gave way, and their own guns were turned 
upon them before they could get off the field. 

Thus, Persifor Smith's brigade, under Colonel Harney, carried, 
and held possession of, the key-point of the battlefield of Cerro 
Gordo. 

After the battle the various details of engineer soldiers joined in 
the pursuit of the enemy, were collected togetherat Encerro, and the 
company remained with Twiggs' division until it reached Jalapa. At 
this place it was furnished by the Chief Quartermaster with the 
finest mule teams in the army. This gave great satisfaction to the 
men who had struggled so hard to get the engineer train forward, 



33 

through deep sand, from Vera Cruz. To add to their elation, they 
had now left the " hot lands " of the coast behind them, had reached 
a temperate climate, 1,000 feel above the level of the sea, had 
escaped the dread vomito of Vera Cruz, and had participated closely 
in the great victory gained by Scott's army at Cerro Gordo. 

From Jalapa, Worth's division led the way, the engineer company 
at its head. During the halt of a few days, at Perote, I procured 
the transfer of First Sergeant David H. Hastings, from the Third 
Artillery to the engineer company. He was considered one of the 
best sergeants in the army, and was at once, made first sergeant of 
the engineer company. Previous to that time we had only an 
acting first sergeant. The company entered Puebla with Worth's 
division, and on the arrival of General Scott at that place we were 
again ordered to report to general headquarters. 

During the three months delay of the army, at Puebla, awaiting 
reinforcements before moving into the valley of Mexico, the regular 
instruction of the company — both as infantry and as engineer 
soldiers — was resumed. Besides the "School of the Sapper " as 
taught them before they left the United States, the men were now 
instructed, theoretically and practically, in the "School of the 
Miner". They were engaged too in work upon the fortifications 
of Puebla; and had practice in loop-holing walls, and received in- 
struction for placing towns, villages, etc. in a state of defense. 
Whilst at Puebla the company received the sad news of the death 
of their Captain. 

General Scott, in his official report of the battle of Cerro Gordo, 
says; " Lieutenant G. W. Smith led the engineer company as part 
of the storming force [under Colonel Harney ], and is noticed with 
distinction ". ( Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 263). 

General Twiggs, in his official report of the same battle, states: 
"Lieutenant G. W. Smith, of the engineers, with his company of 
Sappers and Miners, joined Colonel Harney's command in the 
assault on the enemy's main work, and killed two men with his 
own hand". (Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 278). 

In Colonel Harney's official report of this battle it is stated: 
lieutenant G. W. Smith, of the engineers, with his company, ren- 
dered very efficient service in his own department, as well as in 
the storming of the fort ". ( Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 281 ). 



CHAPTER IV. 

FROM PUEBLA TO CHURUBUSCO. 



On the 7th of August, 1847, the advance of General Scott's army, 
Twiggs' division, the engineer company leading, left Puebla and 
commenced the forward movement into the valley of Mexico. The 
company served with that division, until Worth's division was 
placed in the lead during the turning movement made by the army 
around Lake Ohalco. In that movement the engineer company 
was at the head of Worth's division. 

The road ran between the western border of the lake and a high 
range of hills which, in some places, rose from the water's edge. 
The road was narrow and rough ; and had been obstructed by 
rolling immense masses of stone upon it from the almost overhang- 
ing cliffs. These obstructions were of considerable height ; they 
completely blocked our way; and at several points ditches had 
been cut across the road. 

General Worth directed the Light Battalion, under Colonel C. F. 
Smith, to advance and drive off the Mexicans who were firing 
upon us — ordered me to make the road passable for artillery and 
wagons as soon as possible — and notified me that the leading- 
brigade would assist in that work when called upon. I immedi- 
ately asked for a detail of 500 men ; put them to work, at once, 
under the direction of the officers and men of the engineer company, 
and everything was progressing rapidly, when, to my surprise, 
Lieutenant J. C. Pemberton, aide to General Worth, came up to 
me and insisted that the whole character of the operations should 
be changed. Whilst he was elaborating his views I cut him short 
by asking if lie had any orders for me from General Worth. 
In the meanwhile the latter had reached the front, without either 
Pemberton or I being aware of his presence. Before the aide had 
time to reply to my question, General Worth, in a very peremptory 
tone called out "Come away from there Mr. Pemberton, and let 
Mr. Smith 'alone. This is his business — not yours ". 

In a few hours, the road was put in such condition that, by the 
use of drag-ropes and men at the wheels, we were enabled to pass 
artillery and wagons over the obstructions; and the column moved 
on without further material delay. 

84 



35 

After reaching San Augustine, and passing beyond, the forward 
movement, now on the main road, or causeway, leading from 
Acapulco to the city of Mexico, was cheeked by fortifications about 
six hundred yards in our front. These fortifications crossed the 
road at San Antonio, and were occupied by the enemy in large 
force. The afternoon of the 18th of August, was spent in recon- 
noitring that position. 

About 3 a. m., on the 19th, I received an order to return to San 
Augustine with the engineer company and its train. In making 
our way from the head of Worth's division, along the main road, 
towards the rear, it was somewhat difficult to arouse the men of 
that division, who were sleeping on the road, and get them to clear 
the way for the passage of our wagons. 

No explanation of the order for our return had been given. 
Just after the dawn of day, and before we were clear of the division, 
two soldiers on the side of the road, were lighting a fire for the 
purpose of preparing coffee. As we passed them, one said to the 
other ; " We are not going to fight to-day : Twiggs's division is going 
to fight ". The other of the two replied, sneeringly : " What do you 
know about it?" To which the first answered : "Don't you see 
those young engineer officers, with the engineer company and their 
wagons? They are going back, to be sent on another road with 
Twiggs's division, we are not going to fight to-day". As we passed 
out of hearing of the two soldiers I said to McClellan, who was 
riding by my side: " Did you hear that?" He answered "Yes and 
I consider it the handsomest compliment that could be paid to the 
engineer company. The private soldiers of this army understand 
that we are sent where the hardest work and hardest fighting are 
to be done — and always at the head of the leading division ". 

We reached San Augustine a little after sunrise, August 19. I 
will now quote direct from my official report of these operations. 

"Orders were [at once] received, from the headquarters of the 
army, directing me to report to Captain R. E. Lee, of the Corps of 
Engineers, with the company under my command, and [1] was 
ordered by Captain Lee to take ten of my men, and select certain 
tools from the general engineer train, in addition to those carried 
along with the company. I turned over the command of the en- 
gineer company to Lieutenant McClellan, who, under the direction 
of Captain Lee, proceeded at once to commence the work on the 
road from San Augustine to Contreras." "in about one hour and 
a half, I rejoined the command with the necessary implements for 
[a large working force in] opening the road. Captain Lee directed 
me to retain the men I then had with me, and to take charge of a 



36 

certain section of the road, to bring forward my wagons as rapidly 
as possible, and to see that the road was practicable before I passed 
any portion of it. At this time my company was divided into five 
sections, each under an engineer officer directing operations on 
[different portions of] the road ". 

At Contreras. General Scott, in his official report, says, " By 
three o'clock, this afternoon, [August 19th.] the advanced divi- 
sions came to a point where the new road could only be continued 
under the direct fire of 22 pieces of the enemy's artillery [most of 
them of large calibre] placed in a strong entrenched camp to 
oppose our operations, and surrounded by every advantage of 
ground, besides immense bodies of cavalry and infantry". 

J n my official report it is stated that; " The head of the column 
having halted, I reached the front in time to receive instructions 
from Captain Lee to halt the company, collect the scattered parties, 
and to examine the road inclining to the left, while he went to the 
right. Lieutenants McClellan and Foster had been for some hours 
detached. Having gone about four hundred yards, I heard just 
ahead sharp firing of musketry ; and immediately after met Captain 
McClellan, of the topographical engineers, and Lieutenant Mc- 
Clellan, of the engineer company, returning on horseback — they 
had come suddenly on a strong picket, and were fired upon. 
Lieutenant McClellan had his horse shot under him. Information 
of the enemy's picket being in our vicinity was reported to General 
Twiggs, who ordered a regiment of rifles forward. There being 
several engineer officers present when the rifles came to the front, 
I returned to my company, which had been for a short time left 
without an officer. Captain Lee about this time, sent back for 
Captain Magruder's battery, which was conducted by Lieutenant 
Foster, and placed in position by Lieutenant McClellan ". 

"The Third Infantry was ordered to support the battery. I 
moved forward with this regiment, taking my company and pack 
mules, loaded with tools, and placed my command under such 
shelter as could be found on the left, near the position occupied by 
the Third Infantry, and in rear of the battery. Meeting with 
Lieutenant McClellan, 1 directed him still to remain with the 
battery, but to order Lieutenant Foster to rejoin the company. In 
a few moments this officer reported to me, and brought information 
that the troops were preparing to storm the enemy's position." 

" Riley's brigade had moved in advance by our right, Leaving 
the mules and tools, I moved the company forward, falling in with 
the brigade of General [ Persifor ] Smith. Captain Lee being present, 
with his consent, I requested the General to allow the engineer 



company to fight in his brigade. He told me to take the head of 
the column, and to direct myself towards a church in a village, 
on the left of the enemy's battery— between it and the city. Whilst 
passing down the hill and crossing the ravine, the enemy were 
rapidly appearing [reinforcements from the direction of the city] 
on an eminence beyond the church. General Smith directed me 
to take my company as an escort, reconnoitre the village, and find 
out whether Colonel Riley's brigade was in the vicinity. 1 continued 
some distance bevond the church ; and returned without seeing the 
brigade under Colonel Riley, which had, as I understood after- 
wards, advanced very near [the rear of] the enemy's battery. 
The reinforcements of the enemy upon the hill in our front were 
rapidly increasing. The} 7 had at this time probably ten thousand 
men, on the height, formed in line of battle. Towards dark Colonel 
Riley's brigade returned and joined the troops under the command 
of General Smith : too late, however, to allow time for forming the 
troops to attack the enemy [on the hill ] in our front. Lieutenant 
McClellan joined me about this time in our movement on the 
village. Lieutenant Foster, who was on horseback, became detached 
with a few of the men, and did not rejoin me until after the action 
on the morning of the 20th." 

"General Smith, very soon after dark, informed me that the 
enemy's main battery would be stormed, [in rear], at daylight on 
the morning of the 20th. This would open the road for artillery, 
and our communications with [ the main army under] General 
Scott would be re-established. I received orders to hold the en- 
gineer company ready to move at 3 a. m. and to take my place on 
the right of the rifles. On the morning of the 20th there was con- 
siderable delay in the movement of the brigade [raw troops] under 
General Cadwallader, by which General Smith's brigade, now 
under the command of Major Dimmick, First Artillery, was de- 
tained very nearly an hour. Part of the Eleventh Regiment 
[ Cadwallader's brigade] lost its way. caus id the Voltigeurs to halt, 
thus throwing the brigade under Major Dimmick still further from 
Riley's, which had moved very soon after 3 o'clock. At the request 
of General Cadwallader, Major Dimmick ordered me to turn over 
the command of my company to the officer next in rank, and to 
move forward and conduct the troops that had lost their way. The 
whole force was by sunrise, or little after, halted in a sheltered 
position in rear of the enemy's battery". ( Ex. Doc. No. 1. Appendix 
p. 67). 

1 reported the cause of t he delay to ( reneral Smith and requested 
instructions to rejoin my compan\' ; but he said he desired thai I 



38 

should remain with him for awhile. By his order, the three brigades 
were soon put in motion. I again asked him to permit me to rejoin 
my proper command. He replied " Not yet" and added: " I will 
soon give you instructions". 

Because of a dense fog the delay in reaching the position in rear 
of the Mexican works was no material disadvantage. The fog 
began to disappear about the time I reported to General Smith. 
He was then on a ridge at a point, about 000 yards in rear of the 
Mexican works. The three brigades were passing around the ex- 
tremity of that ridge, several hundred yards in rear of the General. 
All was quite in the lines of the enemy. There was another ridge 
south of the one on which General Smith was standing, and 
separated from it by a deep and very narrow valley. The sides of 
both ridges were precipitous ; their tops sloped gently to the enemy's 
line. 

General Smith informed me that Riley's brigade would pass 
partly beyond the extremity of the second ridge ; then face to the 
left, and attack a strong Mexican detachment which was in position 
on that ridge, several hundred yards in rear of their works. Riley 
was ordered to drive that detachment and pursue it closely into 
the Mexican main lines. Cadwallader's brigade would go on when 
Riley faced to the left; and, as soon as he passed Riley, Cadwallader 
would also face to the left and come into action on Riley's right. 
Smith's own brigade would turn to the left before reaching the 
extremity of the second ridge. The Third Infantry and First 
Artillery would advance in the deep valley between the two ridges ; 
whilst the Rifle Regiment, with the engineer company leading, 
would ascend the steep slope of the second ridge, and get into 
position on the flank, or rear, of the Mexican detachment which 
Riley was to attack in front. In the meantime the head of Smith's 
brigade had come within view, near the foot of the steep slope of 
the second ridge, and was moving towards the Mexican main line. 

General Smith pointed out to me the route to bo taken to reach 
the top of the second ridge; and ordered that the engineer company 
and rifles should bear to the right, and on getting near the Mexi- 
can detachment, remain concealed, and quiet, until Riley's brigade 
became well engaged; then join in the attack and pursuit of that 
detachment. 

With these specific instructions, I was ordered to rejoin my 
company; and Lieutenant Beauregard was directed to take general 
charge of the movements of Smith's brigade. When Beauregard 
and I reached the top of the second ridge we found we were 50 
yards, or less, in rear of the Mexican detachment, which was facing 



39 

Riley, All was quiet. In a very few moments Riley's fire com- 
mence d. 

The engineer company, followed by the rifle regiment was then 
forming in line, under cover, in rear of the Mexican detachment, 
whose attention was concentrated on Riley, in their front. We 
were between thai detachment and the Mexican works. A small 
portion only of the Rifle Regiment was in line, when the firing 
with Riley became very severe, and the order was given for the 
engineer company and rifles to rise and fire into the backs of the 
enemy. That fire was very destructive. The Mexicans were as- 
tounded ; faced squarely about, and in a moment precipitately 
retreated. 

In my official report it is stated that: " Colonel Riley's advance 
became engaged with a very strong picket, some 300 yards or more 
from the rear of the [enemy's] battery, near the crest of the ridge ; 
the engineers and rifles came up at once in position to take the 
picket in rear, delivered a deadly volley within 50 yards, cheered 
and rushed on. The enemy's force fled ; the head of our column 
crossed the line of their retreat, which brought the right of the 
column [engineer company and rifles] conducted by Lieutenant 
Beauregard, in contact with the Seventh Infantry, which formed 
the left of Colonel Riley's brigade. I went into the enemy's battery 
with the colors of the Seventh Infantry, my company immediately 
behind me. The enemy, or at least a portion of them, stood to 
their guns well, and delivered a fire of grape into our troops when 
the head of the column was within 25 yards of their pieces. Our 
troops followed the retreating enemy without halting until they 
were beyond the reach of our musketry. Lieutenant Beauregard 
then strongly advised that the troops be halted and formed. A 
short time afterwards General Twiggs, came up. The pursuit was 
resumed. At San Angel we had an unimportant skirmish ". (Ex. 
Doc. No. 1, Appendix, p. 68 ). 

The following additional quotations from my official report are 
not deemed irrelevant : 

" In the action of the morning of the 20th — the battle of Con- 
treras — my men acted with great gallantry; their promptness in 
obeying every order, and the effect with which they used their 
muskets, entitle them all to the highest praise. In my report to the 
chief engineer in the field, I shall make special mention of all who, 
to my knowledge, particularly distinguished themselves. I will 
mention here, First Sergeant I). II. Hastings, of the engineer com- 
pany, who, by bis gallant conduct and soldiery bearing, in this m 
action, richly deserves promotion to the rank of commissioned 



40 

officer in the army. Sergeant Hastings was slightly wounded by 
my side in the battery. Sergeant [S. H.] Starr attracted my par- 
ticular attention by his gallant and efficient conduct. Sergeant 
Starr was the ranking non-commissioned officer with the detach- 
ment of the engineer company which accompanied Colonel Harney's 
command at the battle of Cerro Gordo. I would recommend him 
for promotion [to the grade of commissioned officer in the army]." 

"Artificer W. H. Bartlett attracted my particular attention by 
[his] cool and steady gallantry, Artificer A. S. Read shot the color 
bearer of the Twelfth Regiment of artillery, and secured the 
color." 

" Lieutenant Foster was at this time, as I have before remarked, 
detached with a portion of the company; and, at the head of his 
men, led the Ninth and Twelfth Regiments of Infantry in their 
attack on the flank of the retreating column at Contreras." 

" Lieutenant McClellan, frequently detached, and several times 
in command of the engineer company, is entitled to the highest 
praise for his cool and daring gallantry, on all occasions, in the 
actions of both the 10th and 20th." (Ex. Doc. No. 1, Appendix, p. 
09.) 

In the pursuit, we passed through the village of San Angel; and 
near that place, were again halted. During that halt, I noticed a 
large, high building, in an extensive open field, five or six hundred 
vards to the North. I was satisfied that from the top of that build- 
ing, with a powerful field glass, which was a portion of the engineer 
company equipment, I would be able to get a good view of the level 
countrv for miles around, and obtain quite definite knowledge of 
the positions and movements of the main Mexican forces. 

I communicated my wishes to Major Loring; and asked him if 
he felt authorized to support the engineer company, with the Rifle 
Regiment, in a close reconnaissance of the building I pointed out. 
He laughingly replied : " I have been directed by General Smith to 
follow you and your company — of course I will go with you ". 

We had not proceeded more than two hundred yards towards 
the building when we were overtaken by Lieutenant Van Dorn, 
Aide to General Smith, who brought an order requiring the Rifle 
Regiment and the engineer company to return to the head of the 
column on the road. I told Van Dorn the purpose I had in view, 
asked him to explain the matter to General Smith, and expressed 
my conviction that he would approve the movement, when he 
knew its object. Van Dorn replied: "General Smith was very 
peremptory. I am directed to see that you and Major Loring, 
with your respective commands, return at once ". On our way 



41 

back, Van Dorn said that General Pillow had reached the front 
and taken control; and his belief was that General Pillow had 
ordered General Smith to recall the engineer company and the 
Rifle Regiment. A short time thereafter we moved from San Angel 
to Coyocan, where the head of the column again halted; and was 
soon joined by General Scott. 

There is good reason to believe that observations, which could 
easily have been made from the roof of the high building above 
referred to, would have resulted in obtaining such information in 
regard to the Mexican position at the Convent of Churubusco and 
at the tete-de-pont, as would have enabled General Scott to complete 
the rout of the Mexican Army without incurring the additional 
loss of nearly one thousand men in killed and wounded. 

At Churubusco. The following quotations are taken from my 
official report: 

" Between 12 and 1 o'clock, p. m., [August 20, 1847] I received 
orders to move, from the village of [Coyocan] immediately after the 
rifle regiment, on a road intersecting the road from San Antonio 
to Mexico, in order to cut off the enemy already retreating from 
San Antonio. 

" I had not gone two hundred yards when I received orders to 
countermarch and move on another route intersecting the road 
from San Antonio to the city nearer to Mexico. [The latter road 
led nearly due east, parallel to the front of the earthworks at the 
Convent, distant from those works about 250 yards]. The regiment 
of riflemen continued on the road on which I first started. [This 
road led south-east from Coyocan]. The company took its place 
[again] at the head of the column [Twiggs's division]. The column 
was halted by General Twiggs, and 1 was directed by him to send 
an officer in advance to see the position of a battery reported to be 
not far in front. Lieutenant McClellan was sent on one road; and 
Lieutenant Stevens of the engineers, was directed by General 
Twiggs, to take another. Both officers soon returned and reported 
a battery in front of a convent, the roof and steeples of which were 
in plain view of the head of the column and within 7<M> yards. 
The roof was crowded with troops; the battery was masked by 
intervening trees and cornfields. General Twiggs then directed 
these officers to make a closer reconnaissance and ordered my 
company as an escort. Having proceeded 500 yards, we saw [ Mex- 
ican ] troops on our right, left, and in front. A lancer was taken 
prisoner. Lieutenant Stevens directed me to take the prisoner to 
the general and request an additional escort of two companies. 
We were at this time about 300 vards from the battery, but it was 



still almost masked from view. I delivered the prisoner and the 
message to General Twiggs, and returned at once to my company 
which I had left in charge of Lieutenant Foster. Lieutenant 
Stevens ioined General Twiggs whilst I was with him. When I 
resumed command of the company, Lieutenant McClellan reported 
to me that our troop* were already engaged in our front) having, ap- 
parently, turned the battery and convent by our right. One of 
General Twiggs's staff', [Lieutenant W. T. H. Brooks, A. A. Adjutant 
General, Twiggs's division,] was present and informed us that the 
rifles with Captain Lee of the engineers, were reconnoitring the 
same works, and had gone to our right considerably farther from 
the battery than we then were. We all concurred in opinion that 
the rifles w T ere engaged with a vastly superior force. There was 
at this time no firing of artillery. I ordered Lieutenant McClellan 
to report the result of his observations to General Twiggs. He 
did so, and on the recommendation of Lieutenants Stevens and 
McClellan, in which I concurred, the First Regiment of Artillery 
w T as ordered to support the rifles. The firing on the right increased ; 
it was evident that several thousands of the enemy were pouring 
a heavy musketry fire into our troops on the right, The tops of 
the convent and the surrounding walls were lined with troops; 
the roof was literally covered. Lieutenant Stevens was of opinion 
that a few rounds of grape would disperse these masses and relieve 
our troops already engaged [on the right] from a destructive 
plunging fire. He went back to the general, leaving myself the 
senior engineer then in front of the [convent] battery. The fire 
had now become very brisk upon my [reconnoitring] party ; having 
placed the company under the best shelter at hand, with Lieu- 
tenant Foster I proceeded to examine the works to determine the 
number, character and position of the pieces of artillery. Nothing 
heavier than a 4 or 6-pounder had yet been fired." (Ex. Doc. No. 
1, Appendix, p. 69.) 

In my official report it is further stated that: "•The troops had 
become engaged in our front within ten minutes after a reconnais- 
sance had been ordered by General Twiggs, and before the officer 
whom I was escorting had been able to make a single observation ". 

In my official copy of that report, I find the following sentence, 
which is not in the printed report : 

" Deeply do I regret that the attack, in advance of the reconnoit- 
ring party, precipitated the attack on our side, and involved us in 
action against we knew not what". 

The force which became engaged, far to our right — before the 



43 

reconnaissance, supported by the engineer company, fairly com- 
menced, was the advance of Worth's division pursuing the Mexicans 
who had abandoned their strong works at San Antonio. 

Captain James L. Mason, engineer of Worth's division, says, in 
his official report, that the works attacked by that division, and 
"so gallantly stormed, had not been reconnoitred ". 

The engineers in front of the convent, being informed that the 
rifles with Captain Lee had gone to our right considerably farther 
from the battery, advised that the rifles be supported by an addition- 
al regiment. The same engineers advised that one gun be sent to 
the front to drive the Mexicans from the roof of the convent, and 
thus relieve our troops on the right from a destructive plunging 
fire. 

The additional escort of two companies, asked for by the recon- 
noitring engineers, had not come to the front. After Lieutenant 
Stevens had gone back to General Twiggs, to have one gun with a 
few rounds of proper ammunition sent forward for the purpose of 
clearing the roof of the convent, the firing in our front, on the 
San Antonio road, had materially increased; and the fire from the 
convent, upon the engineer company, was becoming troublesome. 
There had been, to me, unexpected delay in bringing the one gun 
forward; and I determined, as already stated, to place the men 
under the best shelter at hand, and endeavor to make, in person, a 
closer examination of the works. 

Resuming quotations from my official report — it is therein stated : 

" At this time the First Artillery came up to where I was. The 
lamented and gallant Burke, at the head of the leading company, 
asked which direction they were to take. I inquired what were 
his orders. He said that the regiment was ordered to support the 
Rifles. 1 pointed to the smoke, which was all we could see by 
which to determine the position of our troops engaged in a corn- 
field on our right; told him that they reached their present place 
by moving farther to the rear, out of range of the works; and re- 
marked to him that the fire through which he would have to pass 
in the direction he was going was very severe. He replied that 
they were ordered to move by that road to support the Rifles. The 
First Artillery tiled by and soon encountered, at a distance of 150 
yards from the enemy, the heaviest lire of artillery and musketry, 
followed almost immediately after [by that] brought to bear upon 
Taylor's battery, which had been ordered to fire upon the convent : 
and, in selecting a place suitable for managing the guns, had most 
unfortunately been placed, entirely exposed, directly in front of a 
well constructed battery with heavy pieces firing in embrasure." 



44 

"As the First Artillery filed by me, I ordered my company to be 
formed, determined to go on with the reconnaissance ; and if 
possible, send back to the general, [Twiggs,] accurate information 
in reference to the works of the enemy and the position of our own 
troops, which at that time I could not understand. In moving 
forward, I was opposite the centre of the [First] Artillery which 
inclined more to the left, toward the battery, whilst I kept nearer 
the [principal road leading almost due east from Coyocan]. The 
ground w y as level, but some shelter was afforded to small bodies of 
men, by the ditches, maguey plant, etc. I ordered my men to 
separate, to shelter themselves as much as possible, [and] to keep 
within supporting distance of me. I proceeded about two hundred 
yards. I ordered every man to shelter himself in a small ditch 
which was fortunately near us; immediately after I heard the fire 
of Taylors battery passing directly over my head. [When that 
fire commenced we w T ere] in the corn-field, about half-way between 
Taylor's battery and the enemy. Requiring my command to lie 
close, with Lieutenant Foster, I made my way to an old ruined 
wall in the open space east of the corn-field, and from that position 
sent Lieutenant Foster to General Twiggs to report the extent of 
the line engaged on the right, that we were directly in front of the 
works [which w T ere now in plain view], and that, in my opinion, 
the whole force under General Twiggs's command should turn the 
enemy's position by our left. Another battery [of the enemy] w r as 
seen distinctly to our right and far in rear of the Churubusco bat- 
tery, apparently enfilading our line engaged on the right. General 
Twiggs had already sent Colonel Riley's brigade to turn the posi- 
tion by our left, and take the battery by the gorge. When Lieu- 
tenant Foster returned, I withdrew the company to a position of 
more safety, and joined General Smith and Lieutenant Stevens, 
who were near the place from which I started with the First Artil- 
lery. I remained there [under General Smith's order] until after 
the action." (Ex. Doc. No. 1, Appendix, pp. 70-71.) 

That point was about 300 yards south-west of the convent. 
There were several adobe houses near, and from it a road along 
which there were some huts, led to the convent, and another road, 
almost due east, passed in front of the convent. In moving for- 
ward I had kept nearer the latter road, the First Artillery nearer 
the former. The point I reached in the open, east of the corn-field, 
was within. less than 100 yards of the works at the convent, and 
there was every indication that these works did not extend along 
the western side of that building. 

The place at which I joined General Smith and Lieutenant 



45 

Stevens, after I returned from beyond the corn-field, was that at 
which it had been proposed to place one gun, under cover of the 
adobe hut; run it out by hand ; fire, and run it under shelter 
again to reload. By this means, a few rounds of grape, canister, 
and shrapnel, could have cleared the roof of the convent, 

In more senses than one, the firing of Taylor's battery through 
the ranks of the engineer company, in the corn-field, was a sur- 
prise to me. I learned from Lieutenant Stevens that, when he 
applied for one gun to be sent to the front, those in authority had 
deemed it best to send forward a whole battery, and place it in an 
open field, square in front of the fortifications. 

The battle of Churubusco was commenced, and mostly fought, 
haphazard, against the front of the Mexican fortified lines, without 
giving time for proper reconnaissance. 

General Scott, in his official report of the battle, says : "Lieutenant 
Stevens of the engineers, supported by Lieutenant G. W. Smith's 
company of sappers and miners, of the same corps, was sent to recon- 
noitre the strongly fortified church or convent of San Pablo in the 
hamlet of Churubusco — one mile off [from Coyoean]. Twiggs with 
one of his brigades [Smith's, less the rifles] and Captain Taylor's field 
battery, were ordered to follow and to attack the convent. Major 
Smith, senior engineer, was despatched to concert with Twiggs the 
mode of attack, and Twiggs's other brigade [Riley's] I soon ordered 
to support him." (Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 309.) 

Major John L. Smith, senior engineer, says : "Lieutenant Stevens 
in the reconnaissance of the position of Churubusco, was assisted 
by Lieutenant McClellan and escorted by the company of sappers 
and miners. This company also participated in the operations of 
the right [of Twiggs's division] ". ( Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 353.) 

Major Dimmick, commanding the First Regiment of Artillery, 
says: "About 12 o'clock, M., the battalion was ordered to attack 
the position of the enemy at the church, reported by the engineers 
at the time to have but one piece of artillery. The point of attack 
selected by the senior engineer officer was masked by a corn-field, 
in front of which I deployed the battalion and ordered it to ad- 
vance, when falmost instantly a shower of musketry, grape and 
round shot poured upon us, under which the battalion advanced". 

"The right had advanced to within one hundred yards of a 
regular bastion front, the curtain of which had four pieces in em- 
brasure, besides nearly a thousand infantry, both of which kept up 
such a constant stream of fire that I could not advance further in 
line ; I therefore ordered the men to cover themselves as well as 
possible. The left of the battalion advanced to within seventy 



46 

yards of the work, being exposed to the fire of two pieces of 
artillery, en barbette, in addition to the fire of a considerable force 
of infantry, and some of them still nearer, so that they had a 
destructive fire on the cannoniers and infantry ; which position 
the battalion maintained until the enemy were driven from their 
guns and bastion, when they were followed into their work and 
surrendered." (Ex. Doc. No. 1, Appendix, p. 78.) 

Captain Francis Taylor, commanding light battery, says: "On 
reaching Churubusco, we came in sight of a church, where the 
enemy was posted, having, as was supposed, an entrenched battery 
thrown across the road. Troops were soon thrown forward to attack 
this place ; and, after a short time, I was ordered to place the battery 
in a position where it was thought I could drive the enemy from 
the roof and walls of the church, and sustain the other troops in 
their efforts to carry this place by storm. On taking the position 
assigned me, I found we were exposed to a most terrible fire of 
artillery and musketry, of a regular entrenchment, covering the 
front of the church to which we were opposite, and which the 
intervening Indian corn hid from our sight at the time. Here I 
opened my battery, and it was served with great precision for about 
an hour and a half, notwithstanding it was exposed, during that 
time, to a constant shower of grape, round shot, shell and musket- 
ry. At last, finding my loss was becoming very great, and having 
succeeded in driving the enemy from the roof and walls of the 
church, and given to our troops such support as was in my power, 
I determined to withdraw the pieces". ( Ex. Doc. No. 1, Appendix, 
p. 73). 

The connection between the reconnaissance of the engineers, 
and the operations of the First Artillery and Taylor's battery at 
Churubusco, has already been described in extracts taken from my 
official report. 

In his official report, General Persifor F. Smith says: " Lieutenant 
( r. W. Smith, in command of the engineer company, and Lieutenant 
McClellan, his subaltern, distinguished themselves throughout the 
whole of the three actions [19th and 20th at Contreras ; and at 
Churubusco]. Nothing seemed to them too bold to be undertaken, 
or too difficult to be executed ; and their services as engineers were as 
valuable as those they rendered in battle at the head of their 
gallant men. Lieutenant Foster, being detached from his company 
during the action at Contreras, did not fall under my notice; but 
in the action on the 19th and at Churubusco, he was equally con- 
spicuous for his gallantry ". (Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 332 ). 

General Twiggs, in his official report, says: "To Lieutenant 



(I. W. Smith, of the engineers, who commanded the company of 

sappers and miners, I am under obligations for his services on this 
and on other occasions. Whenever his legitimate duties with 
the pick and spade were performed, he always solicited permission 
to join in the advance of the storming party with his muskets, in 
which position his gallantry, and that of his officers and men, was 
conspicuously displayed at Contreras as well as Cerro Gordo." ( Ex. 
Doc. No. 1, p. 325.) 



CHAPTER V. 

CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF MEXICO. 



During the armistice, which was entered into just after the battle 
of Ohurubusco, and terminated on the 6th of September, the en- 
gineer company was quartered in the village of San Angel. On 
the 7th of September I received orders to move the company, its 
train, and the general engineer train -of the army to Tacubaya. 

Molino Del Rey. That night I was ordered to detail an officer 
and ten men of the engineer company to report to General Worth. 
Lieutenant Foster was placed in charge of this detail. He and 
his men were on the right of the storming party of five hundred 
picked men, of Worth's division, which led the attack against 
Molino Del Rey on the morning of the 8th. In that attack Lieu- 
tenant Foster was very severely wounded and disabled. 

Chapultepec-. On the 11th of September, I received orders to 
furnish details of men from the company to assist engineer ofiicers 
in supervising the construction of batteries against Chapultepec. I 
was placed in charge of Battery No. 1, on the Tacubaya road, 
against the southern face of the Castle ; and Lieutenant McClellan 
in charge of Battery No. 2, against the southwestern angle. On 
the night of the 12tb, the details were all called in, and 1 was 
directed to furnish implements to the different storming panics 
which were to assault the castle of Chapultepec on the morning 
of the 13th. 

San Cosme Garita. At 3 P. M., that day, 1 received orders to 
join the siege train, and report to General Worth whose column 
was to attack the city by the San Cosme route. 

At 4 P. M., I reported to General Worth, who was then with his 
forces, in the suburbs of the city, on the San Cosme causeway, at 
the point where it changes direction, at an angle of nearly ninety 
degrees, and is then nearly straight for about six hundred yards 
to the fortified Garita in our front. He informed me that Lieu- 
tenant Stevens had just been severely wounded and this made me 

(48) 



•1!) 

the senior engineer with Worth's division. He directed me to go 
forward in person, closely examine the condition of affairs at the 
front, endeavor to determine the besi method of operating against 
the fortified Garita, and report to him the result of my observa- 
tions as soon as possible. He directed me, particularly, to have in 
view the question whether it would be advisable to bring the siege 
guns forward against the embrasured battery at the Garita. Just 
as I was leaving him, he said : " If you find there are two different 
methods by which the Garita can be carried, one in a shorter time 
at a sacrifice of men, the other in longer time, but a saving of men, 
choose the latter". And he added : "There have been too many 
valuable lives, of officers and men, lost recently in my division, 
for nothing ". 

Though he did not specify the action referred to, he meant the 
battle of Molino Del Rey. Under these instructions, I proceeded 
to the extreme front, made the requisite examination of our 
position and that of the enemy, and soon come back. I reported 
that the houses on the left of the causeway were built up continu- 
ously to the battery at the Garita, we could easily break through 
the walls from house to house; and, under perfect cover, reach the 
top of a three-story building, with flat roof and stone parapet, 
within 40 yards of the battery. A fire of musketry from that roof 
would make the works untenable ; and we could thus in a short 
time drive the enemy from the fortified Garita, and secure a good 
lodgement within the city, without material loss and without using 
the siege guns. 

General Worth directed me to bring forward the engineer com- 
pany, which was with the siege train a short distance to the rear, 
and commence operations on the proposed plan ; and at the same 
time ordered that Clarke's brigade should render any assistance I 
might call for. 

An hour or more before sunset we reached the top of the house 
above referred to. From that position the inside of the enemy's 
works could be plainly seen almost to the foot of the interior slope 
of the parapet. Our first fire upon the Mexicans, who were uncon- 
scious of the impending peril, was very deadly. Those who were 
not killed or disabled by that lire seemed dazed for an instant : but 
in a few moments, they precipitately retreated, leaving the San 
Cosine Garita without a single defender in the works; One of their 
pieces of artillery was withdrawn a few hundred yards, but was 
then abandoned. 

Immediately after thai first fire, a portion of the force with me 
on the roof became engaged with the enemy who appeared on 



50 

house tops in rear of their battery. We soon drove them from 
their position. The other portion of our men fell back to the stairs, 
made their way to the lower story, broke open the thick, heavily 
barred, strong door, passed into the street, entered the abandoned 
works, and pursued the enemy. In the meantime, some of our 
troops from the right of the causeway had come forward and, a 
very small number of them, were slightly in advance of us in 
reaching the abandoned battery. 

Colonel Garland, commander of the first brigade of Worth's 
division, on the right of the causeway, says, in his official report: 
" The enemy then took position at the Garita San Cosme, where 
they were supported by two pieces of artillery which raked the 
streets with grape and canister. Finding. a secure position to the 
right of the second defence, [about 350 yards in front of the Gar- 
ita], I reorganized the command as it came up ; mounted a howitzer 
on the top of a convent, which, under the direction of Lieutenant 
[U. S.] Grant, Quartermaster, 4th Infantry, and Lieutenant Len- 
drum, 3rd Artillery, annoyed the enemy considerably. About this 
time, report was made to me that considerable progress had been 
made by the troops on the other side of the street by means of 
crowbars and pickaxes, working through houses and yards. This 
caused me to watch closely for the first movement of the enemy in- 
dicative of retreat. The moment this was discovered, the 4th 
Infantry, followed by detachments of the 2nd and 3rd Artillery, 
under Colonel Belton, rushed up the road, when they entered the 
work simultaneously with the forces operating to the right and left, 
Captain McKenzie's storming party slightly in advance". (Ex. 
Doc. No. 1, Appendix, p. 170. ) 

Referring to this operation, General Worth, in his official report, 
says; " the moment had now arrived for the final and combined 
attack upon the last stronghold of the enemy in my quarter; it 
was made, by our men springing, as if by magic, to the tops of the 
houses into which they had patiently and quietly made their way 
with the bar and pick, and to the utter surprise and consternation 
of the enemy, opening upon him, within easy range, a destructive 
fire of musketry. A single discharge, in which many of his gun- 
ners were killed at their pieces, was sufficient to drive him in 
confusion from the breastworks ; when a prolonged shout from our 
brave fellows announced that we were in possession of the Garita 
of San Cosme. and already in the city of Mexico ". ( Ex. Doc. No. 
1, p. 392.) 

The American army having thus captured the fortifications of 
the capital of the enemy's country, a magnificent city of nearly 



200.000 inhabitants, a secure lodgement was immediately effected in 
large houses, on the left of the street, a few hundred yards from 
the Garita. I then proceeded, with the engineer company and an 

infantry detachment, several hundred yards farther; and found a 
strong position, on the right of the street where the troops could 
rest protected from fire. Going farther to the front, I discovered 
that, 150 yards in advance there was a large convent, on the left of 
the street, occupied by a strong force. The next cross street, the 
Paseo, had batteries upon it. These facts were reported to General 
Worth, who ordered forward two brigades — one to occupy each of 
of the positions selected — and, directed me to place those troops, 
station the picket-guards, and then, with Lieutenant McClellan, 
report at his headquarters which was several hundred yards within 
the ( iarita. 

The aqueduct, in the middle of the street along which we ad- 
vanced, was an open stone trough, supported at a height of ten 
feet, or more, by pillars and arches. There was a good deal of 
firing down the street from Mexican detachments; but, by taking- 
shelter under the arches, between the pillars, our men, in small 
groups, were quite well protected. A little before dark, whilst I 
was under one of the arches at the extreme front, endeavoring to 
get a closer view of the enemy at the convent and on the Paseo, I 
was joined by Lieutenant Sydney Smith, of the Fourth Infantry, 
who had borne several messages from me to General Worth during 
the afternoon. In a few moments after he joined me we heard 
horses feet rapidly approaching us from the direction of the citadel. 
These horsemen were captured, and proved to be three Mexican 
officers, one of whom was Adjutant-General on the staff of Santa 
Anna. 

Accompanied by Lieutenant McClellan, I reported to General 
Worth at 10 P. M., and was ordered by him to suspend operations 
for the night and resume them at daylight. He received us both 
very kindly, expressed satisfaction with the manner in whichthe 
works at the (iarita had been carried, and approved of all the dis- 
positions that had been subsequently made of the troops at the 
front. I called his attention again to the convent, told him that 
the large Mexican force in that position might give us a great deal 
of trouble next morning, and asked him to permit me, with the 
engineer company supported by a detachment of about live hundred 
men, to pass the convent that night, get into a strong position be- 
yond it, and thus induce the enemy to abandon that position before 
morning; and said 1 thought it probable a detachment of five 
hundred men could reach the main plaza of the city, that night. 



without material difficulty ; and that, in case this force encountered 
serious opposition, they could take posession of some one of the 
many large, strong buildings on the way, and hold their own 
against the whole Mexican army until relief could reach them. 

General Worth not only refused to comply with my request ; but, 
ordered both myself and Lieutenant McClellan to remain at his 
headquarters until 3 A. M. , at which hour he said he would have 
us called, and we could then go to the front and resume our duties. 

That arrangement left the engineer company, for the night, at 
the extreme front, without an officer. In spite of my earnest re- 
monstrances General Worth insisted that we should remain. On the 
latter point he was inexorable. I finally asked him if I was under 
arrest. He said '• No " and added : " You soon will be if you show 
further hesitation in obeying my order for you to remain here". 

Being awakened by one of General Worth's aides, I asked if it 
was already 3 o'clock. It seemed to me that I had not been asleep 
five minutes. The aide said : " It is about 1 o'clock. A deputation 
from the civil authorities has just informed General Worth that 
Santa Anna's army evacuated the city before midnight, and they 
offered to surrender the city. They have been passed on to General 
Scott, at Tacubaya ; and General Worth wishes to see you at once "'. 

The latter told me more fully about the deputation and their 
proposal to surrender; expressed some doubt in reference to the 
evacuation of the city by the Mexican army ; directed me to return 
to the front; take the engineer company and a detachment of 
infantry ; proceed carefully forward, using every precaution ; and 
report to him the slightest indication that the city had not been 
evacuated. I was directed to examine closely every large building 
and strong position along our route; and not pass them until 
thoroughly satisfied that they were not occupied by Mexican 
soldiers. 

This forward movement commenced about 2 A. M. There was 
some delay in determining whether the strong convent, mentioned 
above, had been evacuated. Accounts on that subject were con- 
flicting; but a thorough examination of the whole position showed 
that it was abandoned. I reported that fact to General Worth, and 
informed him that we would move on with great care, in strict 
compliance with his instructions. 

All buildings of importance were broken open. None of them 
were occupied by the enemy. From time to time, I reported these 
facts to General Worth ; and, at daylight, 1 informed him that, 
from a church steeple near the Alameda, I could see that the Cita- 
del, which had stopped the advance of General Quitman's troops 



53 

early in the afternoon of the 13th, was deserted. At that time, 
Lieutenant McOlellan reported to me there were no signs of the 
enemy in any portion of the Alameda; and I suggested to General 
Worth that his whole division be moved forward. 

In the meantime, with the engineer company and the infantry 
detachment, I passed beyond the Alameda, breaking- open, as before, 
and examining all strong buildings on our route. Wc had gone 
more than two blocks in advance of the Alameda, and were closely 
approaching the Main Plaza and the National Palace, when I re- 
ceived a positive order to countermarch my command, and report 
to General Worth at the Alameda. 1 demurred, and told the aide, 
who bore the order, that I had obeyed all of General Worth's 
cautionary instructions ; that there was no enemy in our front, and 
no reason for calling us back. The aide replied : "The order is 
positive. You must go back.'' I then gave the order to counter- 
march. On our way, the aide, who was a classmate and intimate 
friend of mine, said to me; "General Worth is very cross, he is 
angry. My opinion is that he has received orders from the head- 
quarters of the army which have riled him up badly". 

A few days later I learned from General Worth that he received 
a peremptory order from General Scott not to permit any one under 
his command to pass beyond the Alameda, until further instructions 
were received from the General-in-Chief. 

For several hours after the engineer company took its place on 
the right of Worth's division, at the Alameda, all seemed to be 
quiet in the city. General Quitman's troops, from the Belen Gate, 
had passed the abandoned citadel, reached the Main Plaza, and 
took possession of the National Palace. Later, General Scott, with 
his staff officers and mounted escort, entered the city. 

About that time a shot was fired, evidently aimed at General 
Worth, from a narrow street or lane, opposite the head of the 
division. The shot missed Worth, but very severely wounded 
Colonel Garland. General Worth, immediately ordered me to take 
the engineer company, go into the lane, find the man who fired the 
shot, and hang him. 

Within fifty yards we found the man who I believed tired the 
shot, a rope was placed around his neck, but I did not order my 
men to hang him. I had no positive proof against him. I took the 
man to General Worth, reported the circumstances of the case, in 
full ; stated the reasons for my belief that the prisoner fired the 
shot which severely wounded Colonel Garland; and added : "In 
the absence of specific proof against this man I have brought him 
to you, and await your further instructions". 



54 

To which General Worth replied, in a cold and haughty manner : 
" This is not the way in which my orders are obeyed by officers of 
my division ". 

Colonel Duncan, who was close beside General Worth, both 
mounted, whilst I was on foot, said, at once, before I could make 
any reply to the foregoing censure: " General Worth, you are 
wrong; Lieutenant Smith is right. Under the circumstances he 
ought not to have hanged this man. It is for you, the Major-Gen- 
eral commanding these forces, to decide that matter. Give the order. 
You see he and his men are ready to obey you. Give the order". 

In the meantime, the men of the engineer company, without 
instructions from me, had passed the rope over an adjacent large 
lantern iron ; and stood ready to string the man up. General 
Worth did not. give the order. The man was not hanged. 

In less than an hour after Colonel Garland was wounded, lawless 
bands of armed Mexicans commenced firing from the parapet roofs 
of houses, from church steeples and windows, in various parts of 
the city, upon our troops in the open streets. An order was then 
given, by General Scott, for Worth's forces to move beyond the 
Alameda and join with the rest of the army, in putting down the 
rising of armed outlaws who made this murderous attack upon us 
eight or ten hours after the city surrendered. In these operations 
the engineer company was with Worth's division until the recall 
was sounded late that afternoon. 

( ieneral Scott, in his official report, says : " I communicated, about 
daylight [on the 14th], orders to Worth and Quitman to advance 
slowly and cautiously [to guard against treachery] towards the 
heart of the city, and to occupy its stronger and more commanding 
points. Quitman proceeded to the great plaza or square, planted 
guards and hoisted the colors of the United States on the national 
palace, containing the halls of Congress and executive apartments 
of Federal Mexico. In this grateful service. Quitman might have 
been anticipated by Worth, but for my express orders halting the 
latter at the head of the Alameda, [a green park) within three 
squares of that goal of general ambition". (Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 
383.) 

General Worth, in his official report, says : " At 5 A. M., on the 
14th, my troops and heavy guns advanced into the city, and occu- 
pied the Alameda to the point where it fronts the palace, and there 
halted at 6 o'clock, the general-in-chief having instructed me to 
take a position and await his further orders. Shortly afterwards a 
straggling assassin-like fire commenced from the house-tops, which 
continued, in various parts of the city through the day. causing us 



55 



sonic loss. The first shot, fired at a group of officers at the head of 
my column, struck down Colonel Garland, badly wounded. About 
the time of our entrance into the city, the convicts in the different 
prisons, to the number of some thirty thousand men, were liberated 
by order of the Hying government, armed and distributed in the 
most advantageous houses, including the churches, convents, and 
even the hospitals, for the purpose of exciting, if possible, the city 
to revolt ". 

In epeakkig of the general operations of his forces in the capture 
of the city, General Worth adds: 

" Officers and men of every corps carried themselves with wonted 
gallantry and conduct. Of the staff; Lieutenants Stevens, Smith, 
and McClellan, engineers, displayed the gallantry, skill and conduct, 
which so eminently distinguished their corps ". (Ex. Doc. No. .1, 
pp. 393-4.) 

General Scott adds: "Captain Lee, engineer, so constantly dis- 
tinguished, also bore important orders from me [September 13] 
until he fainted from a wound and the loss of two nights' sleep at 
the batteries. Lieutenants Beauregard, Stevens, and Tower, all 
wounded, were employed with the divisions, and Lieutenants G. W. 
Smith and G. B. McClellan with the company of sappers and miners. 
Those five lieutenants of engineers, like their captain, won the 
admiration of all about them". (Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 385.) 

Major John L. Smith, senior engineer, says : " Lieutenant Smith 
reports all the sappers who were engaged on the 13th and 14th, to 
have conducted themselves with intelligence and intrepidity alto- 
gether satisfactory ; but, he mentions the orderly sergeant, Hastings, 
who was wounded, as being eminently distinguished, and he 
mentions also artificer Gerber, as having been particularly dis- 
tinguished". (Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 430.) 

Without dwelling upon details of the fighting in the streets and 
houses on the 14th, it may be stated that, a short time before the 
recall was sounded, when Orderly Sergeant Hastings fell, Lieu- 
tenant McClellan seized the Sergeant's musket, fired at, and killed 
the man who shot Hastings. In a few moments thereafter the com- 
pany passed the dead body of that "liberated ", convict Mexican. 

The unoccupied private house in which we were quartered that 
night was near the place at which the man, who shot Colonel 
Garland, had been left tied to a lantern iron with a rope around 
his neck. When we returned the man was gone. Nothing further 
was said or done upon our side, in his case. 

An hour or more after we were comfortably "settled in our new 
home", I noticed that McClellan was very quiet for a considerable 



56 

time, evidently thinking of matters which deeply interested him. 
An occasional marked change seemed to come over the spirit of 
his dream. Finally I awakened him from his reverie, saying: "A 
penny for your thoughts. I have been watching you for half an 
hour or more, and would like much to know, honor bright, what 
you have been thinking about". 

To which he replied : " I have been making a 'general review ' 
of what we have gone through since we left West Point, one year 
ago this month, bound for the ' Halls of the Montezumas '; have 
been again on the Rio Grande, that grave-yard of our forces ; have 
gone over the road from Matamoros to Victoria and Tampico, where 
we had so much hard work ; went through the siege of Vera Cruz, 
where we were left out in the cold during the ceremonies of sur- 
render, and later, had to make our way as best we could, with the 
engineer train through the horrid sand ; glanced at Cerro Gordo, 
where it was my misfortune to be with General Pillow's ' whipped 
community '; stopped again with our friends, the Monks, in the 
convent at Puebla ; crossed over the mountains ; came by way of 
San Antonio, Contreras, Churubusco, Chapultepec and the San 
Cosme Garita, into this city. Here we are — the deed is done — I am 
glad no one can say ' poor Mac ' over me ". 

The capture of the city, and its occupation by General Scott's 
army, virtually ended the war made by the United States against 
Mexico. 



CHAPTER VI. 

IN THE CITY OF MEXICO— RETURN TO WEST POINT. 



After the street fighting on the 14th, the city was quiet and re- 
mained so. The men of the company were fairly entitled to a good 
rest and a new outfit of clothing ; but the quartermaster could not 
then furnish the latter. At their request, I authorized them to 
purchase a better quality of cloth than that furnished by the gov- 
ernment, and to have finer material for trimmings than the coarse 
cotton braid allowed by the regulations. The clothing was made 
by good tailors and paid for by the men. In the course of a month 
or six weeks, the company was provided with handsome, well-fitting 
uniforms. 

In the meantime, drills were suspended for about a month. 
During that period the only duty required of the men, other than 
that of ordinary guard over their quarters and the engineer train 
of the army, was that of details to assist engineer officers in making 
surveys of the recent battle-fields. 

In the latter part of October, the surveys of the battle-fields 
being completed, and the men provided with new and well-fitting 
uniforms, infantry drills were resumed. An order was issued re- 
quiring the company to be formed without arms, the next day, in 
the Alameda, for squad drill. Immediately thereafter, one of my 
most trusted sergeants informed me that this order caused great 
dissatisfaction in the company. He said the men felt they would 
be degraded if now turned back to the beginning — at squad drill 
without arms — thus placing them in the position of raw recruits, 
whilst the rest of the army were being exercised at brigade and 
division drill, "evolutions of the line,'* with all attendant "pomp 
and circumstance". 

The sergeant warned me that the state of feeling in the company 
would, in his opinion, lead to serious trouble if the order was 
carried into effect. I thanked him for the information. 

When the men were formed on the drill ground next day, I told 

(57) 



58 

them 1 was aware of their opposition to the order; but, that I was 
under the impression I commanded that company, and if there 
was a man amongst them who felt disposed to dispute my legal 
authority he was requested to step to the front. No one moved. I 
then directed the artificers and privates to go to their quarters, and 
inform the sergeant of the guard they had my permission to be 
absent until evening parade. Turning to the non-commissioned 
officers, I stated that, in my judgment, there was no occasion for 
them to feel degraded if drilled by their own officers at squad drill 
without arms. 

I drilled the sergeants, McClellan the corporals. Whilst the 
non-commissioned officers were being thus drilled, the men were 
allowed daily liberty from quarters. Later, the non-commissioned 
officers drilled the men in squads under the supervision of the 
officers. Instruction and practice in the infantry " School of the 
Company " was then resumed ; and, after a time, each non-com- 
missioned officer was required, in turn, to take his place by my 
side and drill the company. On those occasions, the men were 
warned that no inattention or remissness on their part would be 
tolerated ; no matter how lenient with them I might choose to be 
when commanding in person. 

It is safe to say that within six weeks from the time squad drills 
without arms were commenced in the engineer company, in the 
City of Mexico, that company as Infantry, was better drilled than 
any other in the army. In that respect, and in discipline, they 
were pattern soldiers. Regular instruction in the "School of the 
Engineer Soldier" was then resumed. 

From raw recruits, on the Rio Grande, disturbed by the epithet, 
"pick and shovel brigade " applied to them, at that time, by the 
soldiers of the line, the engineer company had become veterans of 
more than half a dozen important battles; had always been in the 
front of the fighting; and had often been called upon to direct 
large working parties of soldiers, detailed to use the "pick and 
shovel ". 

About two months after we entered the city of Mexico, it was 
reported to me, by the sergeant of the guard, that Artificer Gerber 
was then absent, two hours beyond the time limit of his pass. I 
directed the sergeant to send Gerber to me, in my quarters, as soon 
as he returned. 

Frederick W. Gerber was one of the four men, enlisted by Captain 
Swift, who had served in the old regular army. He was enlisted 
as musician, and was the finest bugler in the service. He was soon 
made company clerk, and had thorough knowledge of routine 



50 

"company papers '. Lie was German by birth. As company clerk 
his duties brought him in close relations with the commander of 
the company; and I soon formed a very high estimate of his qual- 
ities as a soldier — and as a man in every respect : except that he 
would, on occasion, at intervals, when oil' duty, indulge too freely 
in strong drink. 

I had repeatedly threatened to deprive him of his warrant as 
artificer, if he did not quit drinking to excess; but I was reluctant 
to do so, especially because his promotion to that grade was in re- 
ward for distinguished gallantry in the attack on the " key-point" 
of the Mexican position at the battle of Cerro Gordo. 

When it was reported to me that he had not returned within the 
time of his " pass ", I was quite sure he was again " on a spree ". It 
was several hours later when he reported to me as ordered by the 
sergeant of the guard. 

1 was alone when he entered my room. He had evidently been 
drinking to excess; but was to some 1 extent recovering. I charged 
him with being drunk; told him he had behaved so well in that 
respect lately that I had made up my mind to recommend his 
being promoted to the grade of corporal; and even to that of 
sergeant, when opportunity was afforded me, and added: "You 
know 1 cannot make such recommendation whilst you continue 
this habit of getting drunk ". He replied : " The lieutenant is mis- 
taken : 1 am not drunk, and, if he will allow me, I will satisfy him 
on that point ; and explain to him how I happened to overstay 
my pass". I told him to go on with his explanation. 

He said that soon after he left the company quarters, early that 
morning, with permission to be absent for four hours, he met with 
a sergeant he had known as a private in the old regular service 
long before the war. They were glad to see each other, took a few 
drinks, and then hired a carriage for a drive of several hours in 
the great city they had helped to capture. He added : "During 
the drive the sergeant got mad and threatened to have me arrested 

I told him that 'no d d infantry sergeant had rank enough to 

arrest an artificer of engineers'. He then offered to tight me. We 
slopped the carriage, got out, drew our swords, and 1 told him to 
come on, and we would soon settle the matter. He attacked me, 
and I disarmed him, kept his sword, made him get into. the carriage, 
drove to General Twiggs's headquarters, reported to the sergeant 
of his guard, told him what had occurred; and asked him to hold, 
as a prisoner, the sergeant that had attacked me ". 

"But he, being afcso an infantry sergeant, released the sergeant I 
had brought there, made me a prisoner, and demanded my sword. 



60 

I gave it to him ; but, when he ordered me to give up the sword I 

had captured, I told him I would see him d d first; and I kept 

it. I then asked to be taken before General Twiggs. They told 
me he was out". 

" In three or four hours General Twiggs returned, and when he 
was passing through the sally-port, the guard all in line, at pre- 
sent-arms, saluting him ; I rushed in front of his horse, and calling 
him by name, told him his guard had made me a prisoner, and I 
asked for justice at his hands. He ordered me to get out of his 
wa} r . Still standing in front of his horse, I again asked for justice. 
To which he replied : 'Who in the h— 11 are you?' When I told 
him who I was, he said : ' How is it that you are a prisoner in my 
guard-house? ' I told General Twiggs the whole story : and showed 
him the infantry Sergeant's sword I had captured ; and which his 
guard tried to make me give up. General Twiggs then asked me 
if I was willing to hand that sword to him. I gave it to him at 
once; and he ordered the sergeant of the guard to release me and 
give me back my own sword. I then came straight home. - ' 

After hearing Gerber's story, on which I placed implicit reliance, 
I strongly advised him to let liquor alone in future: and, again 
told him I would gladly have him promoted, if he would quit 
drinking. 

Some time after we returned to the United States, and I had left 
the company, I learned that, during the time Gerber was closeted 
with me, opinion in the company was divided, and ran high in re- 
gard to the course I would take in his case. All the men knew that 
he was deservedly a great favorite of mine, Some of them said 
I would let him off; others that I would deprive him of his 
warrant as artificer, and otherwise punish him. 

These conflicting opinions as to what I would do in Gerber's 
case, were freely backed by heavy bets among the men. When he 
joined them, all were anxious to know what "the lieutenant" was 
going to do — "what did he say?" To which he replied: "It is 
none of your business". For some time they could get nothing 

more from him. But he finally said: "D n it, if you must 

know; the lieutenant told me he would make me a corporal ". 

The sergeant w T ho gave me the facts just related, added : " Previous 
to that time, Gerber was believed, by the whole company, to be a 
perfectly truthful man. But many of the men thought he lied on 
that occasion. Although he has been truthful ever since, there is 
still, amongst us, very grave suspicion in regard to the correctness 
of his assertion that vou then told him vou -would make him a 



61 

corporal. J would like very much to know the truth in regard to 
that matter". I replied: " Gerber told the truth". 

Jt will be .shown later, by extracts from official correspondence, 
that 1 was not permitted to recommend for promotion, in the com- 
pany, any of the gallant men under my command who were so 
highly distinguished in the various battles that occurred in the 
Valley of Mexico. So I had no opportunity to have Gerber made 
a corporal — much less a sergeant.* 

The following extracts from correspondence, and from my month- 
ly reports, give a brief official account of the affairs of the company 
after the capture of the City of Mexico. 

On the 4th of October, 1847, I addressed to Lieutenant I. I. 
Stevens, Adjutant of Engineers, for the information of the senior 
engineer in the field, and the General in Chief, a letter from which 
the following quotations are taken: 

"By the last advices that I have received I learn that only six 
engineer recruits have been made in the United States since Sep- 
tember, 1846. During that time the effective strength of the com- 
pany in the field has been reduced from seventy-one to thirty-six. 
Something must be done. I have endeavored to reenlist good men 
whose terms of enlistment'in other corps had expired ; I have tried 
to get transfers of good men, and succeeded in obtaining but one. 
The senior engineer, believing that more could be done, attempted 
it himself — he procured none". 

"At Vera Cruz my men were worked too hard ; many of them 
are suffering yet from disease contracted there. Time, labor and 
life would have been saved if we had had the proportion of en- 
gineer soldiers usual in the armies of civilized nations. At Cerro 
Gordo, when I could furnish ten men [for details], fifty, at least, 
were necessary. In the operations in this valley, the same necessity 
has been felt for a larger number of soldiers of this character. 
There ought to be more companies of engineer soldiers in this 
army. Certainly, measures should be taken to complete the num- 
ber of men allowed in the only company now authorized. I know 
of none so likely to succeed as sending an officer and non-commis- 
sioned officers [to the United States] on this duty "• 

In my official report for the month of November, 1847, it is 
stated: "The system of instruction now being pursued is the fol- 
lowing: From 9 A. M. until l():4o A. M., recitations and instruction 

♦Frederick w, Gerber, was enlisted in Co. "A," June 29, 1846, after previous service in the 
4th Infantry, which he joined in 1839, and under the Act of March :!. is+it, was discharged 
April ii, ls4'.i. He was r< enlisted the same day and continued in the service until his drat h at 
the Post of Willpts Point, N. v.. November 10, L875. He was appointed Artificer, April 18, 
1847, Corporal. August 1, 1848. Sergeant, February I. 1849, and was Sergeant .Major of the Bat- 
talion of Engineers from February 21, 1867, to the date of his death. 



f32 

of the whole company, under direction of both officers, in Manuel 
<iu Sapeur, together with lectures and recitations on field fortifica- 
tions. From 11 A. M. until 12:30 P. M., [infantry drill]. From 
2 P. M. until 4 P. M., recitations in arithmetic and practice in 
writing. Each officer has a section in arithmetic, and gives a gen- 
eral superintendence to a section in writing. Instruction in writing- 
is given by sergeants ". 

" I have nothing new to offer either in reference to the property, 
the enlistment of men, or the settlement of the accounts of the late 
Captain Swift. All, in my opinion, matters of importance ; but 
already referred to, [in previous reports and correspondence], per- 
haps, too often ". 

"It is just one year since, by the casualties of service, the com- 
mand of this company devolved upon myself as the senior officer 
for duty with the engineer troops. During this time the interests 
of the general engineer service, particularly of the non-commis- 
sioned officers and men, have materially suffered for want of an 
officer of rank at the head of the company. In the French service 
two captains are assigned to every company of this character, and 
the companies are all [well] instructed before they take the field. 
I earnestly recommend that four officers of engineers be assigned 
to duty with this company. The commander should be an officer 
of rank ; his position permanent. In case the Chief Engineer 
should order an officer into the field to take command of Company 
A, engineers, I respectfully request that I may be ordered to the 
United States as soon as relieved from this duty ". 

On the 1st of February, 1848, I reported that the course of in- 
struction, adopted for the company, " had been continued, with 
satisfactory progress on the part of non-commissioned officers and 
men ". 

On the 27th of February, 1848, in a letter to Colonel Totten, 
Chief Engineer, Washington, I). ('., transmitting copies of certain 
pa pel's, I stated : 

"I would respectfully refer you to my communication of ( October 
4th, 1847, addressed to the then Adjutant of Engineers, in which I 
strongly urged that the interest of the engineer service required 
that an officer and non-commissioned officers should be ordered to 
the United States for the purpose of obtaining recruits for this 
company. Such is the course pursued in every other arm of ser- 
vice: and I hesitate not to say that, had my recommendation, as 
commander of the engineer company, been acted upon favorably, 
at that time, we would now have in this city, a full company. I 
have referred often to the wants of the company, without favorable. 



63 

action having been had on my recommendations. We are not fur- 
nished with men, not allowed to take the usual and, in my opinion, 
necessary means of procuring recruits. I respectfully request to be 
relieved from the command of the engineer company without 
further delay than is necessary for the arrival of the captain com- 
mander in this city ". 

Owing to casualties of service, I had almost continually com- 
manded the company, its train, and the general engineer train of 
the army for more than a year. My rank was that of Second 
Lieutenant — low on that list. I was conscious that my rank or 
lack of rank, rather, was, in some essential respects, a detriment to 
the company. 

It was believed that the war was over; but, in freely expressing 
willingness to give up the command I had long exercised, to which 
I had no claim based upon rank, I did not hesitate to say that: 
" If the war should be continued, and an additional company of en- 
gineer soldiers was authorized to be raised, thus creating an engineer 
battalion, I would be more than willing to command it in the field: 
provided, I was made Major, by brevet, and assigned to duty with 
that rank ". 

In my official report for the month of March, 1848, it is stated ; 
" During the month, daily instruction [of the company] in branches 
pertaining to engineering has been omitted, I have thought it 
best to pay more attention to their improvement in writing and 
arithmetic. The infantry exercises are continued ". 

On the 1st of May, I reported : " During the month of April the 
course of instruction and drill pursued in March has been con- 
tinued, with satisfactory results". 

" Three 'privates of this company have been appointed [by the 
government at Washington] commissioned officers. Three ser- 
geants, all men of intelligence, education and character, have 
been recommended [b}' me], in compliance with law, for commis- 
sions; they having all been repeatedly distinguished for gallant 
and high soldierly conduct in battle. [As yet] none of these ser- 
geants have received [appointments] ". 

When it became generally known in the army that the Mexican 
Government had agreed to the proposed treaty of peace, and that 
the formal ratification would soon be consummated, I requested the 
senior engineer, Captain R. E. Lee, to direct me to sell the tools, 
etc.. of the engineer train, in the city of Mexico: order me to pro- 
ceed to the coast by the first opportunity, for the purpose of looking 
up, and accounting for, a large amount of engineer property for 
which the estate of the late Captain A. J. Swift was responsible; and 



64 

authorize me to turn over the command of the engineer company to 
Lieutenant McClellan, when I started for the coast. 

In compliance with Captain Lee's instructions, the tools were sold. 
They brought more than they had originally cost in the United 
States. I left the city of Mexico the day the treaty of peace was 
signed on the part of the Mexicans; and accompanied General 
Persifor F. Smith to Vera Cruz, at which place he was charged 
with making all preparation; for the transportation of the army to 
the United States. Before leaving the City of Mexico I turned over 
the command of the engineer company to Lieutenant McClellan. 
I was detained in Vera Cruz about two weeks, obtaining informa- 
tion in regard to, and making disposition of, the public property 
in that vicinity, for which Captain Swift's estate was then held 
responsible. 

The accounting officers of the government in Washington, had 
charged against him, on their books, the value of large amounts of 
property which had been shipped to, but never received by him. 
Several vessels, partly loaded with portions of that property, were 
shipwrecked by northers during the seige of Vera Cruz. In the 
time I spent at that place after the war ended, I obtained knowledge 
which enabled me to clear up all accounts against the estate of 
Captain Swift. The amount of that nominal indebtness far ex- 
ceeded the value of his property ; which would have been unfairly 
sacrificed to the government, and have left his name unjustly tar- 
nished as that of a defaulter, if conclusive evidence of the facts in 
the case had not been furnished to the accounting officers. 

The engineer company, under Lieutenant McClellan, accom- 
panied by all the engineer officers from the City of Mexico, left 
that city on tha 28th of May, 1848, and marched to Vera Cruz. 
From the latter place the company was transported by steamer to 
New York City ; arrived at West Point, N. Y., on the 22nd of June; 
reported to the superintendent of the Military Academy, and was 
immediately ordered to report to Captain George W. Cullum, of the 
engineer corps, as its new commander. I remained about a week 
in Vera Cruz after the company sailed ; arrived at West Point in 
July ; and was ordered to report to Captain Cullum. 

A short time thereafter, I asked to be relieved from duty with 
the company ; and applied for six months leave of absence. The 
leave was granted, and it was understood that, on its expiration, I 
would be ordered to other engineer service. 

Before the expiration of my leave, the war men of the company 
procured the passage of an act by Congress, authorizing their dis- 
charge from the service. Under that act nearly all the men of 



the company, who had served in Mexico, immediately obtained 
their discharge from the army. This virtually reduced the company 
to the detachment of recruits which had been collected and re- 
tained at West Point. 

At the expiration of my leave of absence I w T as formally relieved 
from further direct service with the engineer company; and at the 
request of the Chief Engineer, consented to undertake the enlist- 
ment of new recruits to fill the places in the company vacated by 
the war men, who had been discharged. That business was 
finished within a few months. I was then ordered on other en- 
gineer duty and, thus, my connection with the engineer company 
ended. 



APPENDIX A. 

BRIEF EXTRACTS, FROM WILCOX'S HISTORY OF THE 
MEXICAN WAR, 1892. 



" General Patterson was ordered to march [December, 1846,] from 
Matamoros to Victoria with three regiments of volunteers, two 
pieces of artillery, and the engineer company under Lieut. G. W. 
Smith ". (p. 187.) 

Vera Cruz. " This line of investment, through the chapparal 
and over the sand hills, was located by Lieut. G. W. Smith, of the 
engineers, assisted by Lieut. G. B. McClellan, and a roadway along 
the line was made under the supervision of these two lieutenants 
with the engineer company and a party of several hundred sol- 
diers ". (p. 246.) 

Cerro Gordo. "On the arrival of the engineer company and 
train at Plan del Rio [April 17th, 1847], Lieut. G. B. McClellan 
with a party of ten men reported to General Pillow, and, Lieut. 
G. W. Smith with [the rest of] his men and a portion of the train 
to General Twiggs ". 

" That night [17th] one 24-pounder and two 24-pound howitzers 
were placed in position on the Atalaya, the battery being con- 
structed under the supervision of Lieut. G. W. Smith, assisted by 
Lieut. John G. Foster of the engineers, the location of the batten- 
having been determined by Capt. R. E. Lee ". (p. 286.) 

From Puebla to the Valley of Mexico. " Riley's brigade 
was guided by Capt. Lee, assisted by Lieut. John G: Foster with 
ten men of the engineer company", (p. 287-8.) 

" It was the rule with General Scott that one of the only two 
regular divisions should always be in front. The engineer com- 
pany headed the column. There was but one company of engineer 
soldiers in the United States army ". (p. 339.) 

In the Valley of Mkxico. "Beyond San Gregorio, the bor- 
der of Xochimilco was skirted, and here obstructions in the road 
were first encountered, a ditch having been dug across it, and large 

(66) 



67 

stones rolled down from the hillside; bul these obstacles were soon 
overcome by the engineer company with a detail from the leading 
brigade, while the Mexicans, who were tiring from the heights 
above, were driven off by Colonel C. F. Smith's light battalion", 
(p. 355.) 

Contreras. "The engineer company was recalled from Worth, 
and with a working party of 500 men, was ordered to make the 
road to Padierna practicable for artillery ". (p. 362.) 

" When Smith's brigade advanced as described, the engineer 
company, under Lieut. G. W. Smith, went into action with the 
Third Infantry of that brigade ". ( p. 363.) 

" General Smith moved to his right and front across the p'edrigal, 
the Rifles, with the engineer company at their head, leading ". 

'• At 2:30 A. M. of the 20th [August, 1847], the troops under Gen- 
eral Smith began to form and take their places preparatory to the 
march which would bring them on Valencia's rear. Leading the 
Rides in front of the brigade was the engineer company ". (p. 369.) 

" The engineer company and the Rifles, being already in position 
in rear of the Mexican detachment, then rose and firing a volley 
upon it, and Riley continuing on upon them, they faced about, 
broke, and fled in the utmost precipitation to the main line in 
rear, pursued by Riley, the Rifles and engineer company ". (p. 70.) 

ChuRUBUSCo. "At Coyoacan General Scott joined, having pre- 
viously ordered his columns to halt there. Lieut. I. I. Stevens, 
ordered about the same time to advance on the direct road and 
reconnoitre, was supported by the engineer company under Lieut. 
G. W. Smith. This reconnaissance covered the Convent of San 
Pablo in the village of Churubusco ". (p. 378-9.) 

( iiapultepec. "Battery No. 1 was constructed under Lieut. 
G. W. Smith's supervision, and Battery No. 2 under Lieut. G. B. 
McClellan's. Details were made from Quitman's division to assist 
the engineer company in the construction of these works, but al- 
though directed to report immediately after dark they did not arrive 
until near 4 A. M., of the 12th ; hence these works, which were to 
have been finished before daylight, were hardly commenced by that 
time. The engineers were however, indefatigable, and the batteries 
were completed rapidly ". (p. 452.) 

City ok Mexico. "Lieut. G. W. Smith, with the company and 
train under his command, reported to General Worth on the [San 
Cosme] causeway, [in the afternoon, September loth], was in- 
formed that the wounding of Lieut. Stevens made him [Smith] the 
senior engineer of the attack then going on, and was instructed to 
go to the front, closely and carefully examine the state of affairs, 



68 

return as soon as practicable, and report the best method of con- 
ducting the attack ". He reported " that infantry alone on the left 
of the road could capture the gate, without artillery and with 
little loss, by making its way through the houses. He was ordered 
to take the engineer company and tools, return to the front, and 
carry out the plan proposed ". ( p. 476.) 

" The Mexicans did not remain long in front of Worth; after dark 
the signal for retreat of one command was given, and being heard 
by all, they left the buildings and scattered in all directions, their 
officers being unable to restrain them. In a little while, however, 
they repaired to the citadel. In one of the pavilions a council was 
held. Santa Anna presided, explained the untoward incidents of 
the day, and asked the opinions of those present as to whether or 
not the defence of the capital should be prolonged. There was 
discussion and opposition, but, Santa Anna announced his decision 
in these emphatic words : ' I resolve that this night this city must 
be evacuated ' ". ( p. 480-1.) 

"At 1 o'clock A. M. of the 14th commissioners from the muni- 
cipal government of the city approached the advanced post of 
Worth's command, were passed to his headquarters, and by him 
sent to General Scott's headquarters in Tacubaya ". (p. 481.) 

"General Worth then directed the two engineer officers, serving 
with his command, to proceed to the front and with a detachment 
of infantry and the engineer company, closely examine all strong 
buildings, and direct operations toward the Main Plaza and 
National Palace. The senior engineer being directed to make 
known promptly any indication that the rumored evacuation was 
incorrect, reported that everything indicated that the Mexican 
army had abandoned the city ". (p. 481.) 



APPENDIX B. 

PROMOTIONS OF ENLISTED MEN OF THE COMPANY. 



Tepe Agualco, Mexico, 

May 4, 1847. 
Colonel JOSEPH G. TOTTEN, 

Chief Engineer, 

Washington City. 
Sir: 

"I have the honor to inform you that, on the 25th of April, 
First Sergeant Hastings of ' K ' Company, Third Artillery, was, 
by order of General Worth, transferred to the Engineer Corps, sub- 
ject to the approval of the Commander-in-Chief. 

"Sergeant Hastings has the reputation of being one of the best 
first sergeants in the army. He was for 7 or 8 years orderly ser- 
geant in the Second Infantry. He is an intimate friend of Sergeant 
Everett ;* is a well educated man, very intelligent ; a remarkably 
fine looking soldier, a good drill sergeant. 

"By birth he is an Irishman — he came to this country quite 
young, and was brought up in Po'keepsie, N. Y. 

" We were very much in want of an orderly sergeant. I think 
there can be no doubt but we have secured a prize. 

" I would be glad if you would send a Sergeant's warrant for 
David H. Hastings. I respectfully recommend the following pro- 
motions and appointments in the engineer company: 

Corporal Benjamin W. Coit, acting lance sergeant since 1st of 
February, to be sergeant from February 1st, 1847: 

Artificer Charles A. Viregg, lance corporal since 1st of February, 
to be corporal from February 1st, 1847: 

Artificer Ethan T. Sheldon, lance corporal since 1st of February, 
to be corporal from February 1st, 1847: 

* Thornton S. Everett was property sergeant of the engineer company; had charge of its 
train from the time of his enlistment in the company until its return to West Point; and, in 
addition, had charge, in Mexico, of the general engineer train of the army. 

(89) 



70 

Artificer William A. Noyes, to be corporal from the 18th of 
April, 1847; 

"Privates Charles A. Pierce, Jacob T. Smith, Benjamin L. Boomer, 
Edwin M. Hollo way, James Brannan, Joseph A. Mower, David P. 
Weaver, Thomas Bigley, Seth H. Taylor, and Charles A. Porter, 
to be artificers from the 29th of March, 1S47 : 

"Musician Frederick W. Gerber to be artificer from the 18th of 
April, 1847: 

"Privates Augustus B. Hussey, James B. Vansant, and William 
S. Bliss, to be artificers from the 29th of March, 1847: 

"Corporal William Bartlett, reduced to the grade of artificer, 
May 1st, 1847: 

" Artificer Hiram B. Yeager to be corporal from May 1st, 1847: 

" Artificer Charles W. Bont reduced to the grade of second class 
private from May 1st, 1847: 

" I respectfully call to the attention of the Chief Engineer the 
fact that, in accordance with his suggestion, I have delayed making 
the above recommendations, and now urge them as my deliberate 
opinion. I hope they will be favorably acted upon. 

" My monthly return for April shows a total of sixty-two. My 
recommendations make, in the company, six sergeants, six cor- 
porals, one musician, twenty-three artificers and twenty-six second 
class privates". 

Very respectfully, 

Your obdt. servt., 
GTS. W. SMITH, 

Lieut.. Comdg. Engr. Co. 

The foregoing recommendations were approved and the appoint- 
ments were received whilst the company was in the city of Puebla. 

Soon after the war ended, Sergeants Hastings, Starr and Everett 
were promoted to be commissioned officers in the " Old Regular 
Army" of the United States. Later, Sergeant Warren L. Lothrop 
was given a commission in that army. 



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